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ABSTRACT 
 
 
FAIR OR FOUL? DETERMINING THE RULES OF THE FAIR PRICING GAME 
 
By 
 
JODIE LYNNE FERGUSON 
 
DECEMBER 5, 2008 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Pam S. Ellen 
 
Major Department: Marketing 
 
 
Past research on perceived price fairness has examined outcome fairness, or the fairness of an 
offered price in respect to other prices (e.g., Campbell 1999a; b). In this research consumers’ 
perceived fairness of the process used by the retailer to set the price, as well as outcome 
perceived price fairness (PPF), were examined. In the first of two studies, twelve price-setting 
practices were evaluated on procedural fairness, pervasiveness (i.e., commonness of price-setting 
practice in the marketplace), and social acceptability within six contexts. Social acceptability was 
found to be highest when the price-setting practice was both procedurally fair and perceived to 
be highly pervasive for a given context. An experiment bridged the two concepts of price 
fairness by detecting the negative effect of using a socially unacceptable price-setting practice on 
outcome PPF. Also, evidence of multidimensionality (i.e., a cognitive and an affective 
dimension) of the PPF construct was confirmed in the second study. Cognitive and affective 
assessments of PPF were found to bring about greater consumer intention to partake in self-
protection behaviors such as complaining, and revenge-seeking behaviors such as posting 
negative online reviews. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 For marketers to communicate the value of goods or services to customers, prices are a 
key basis. In setting prices, marketers may consider a variety of factors such as costs, demand, 
competitive pressures, and opportunities to differentiate their offerings. According to dual 
entitlement theory, consumers understand that sellers are entitled to set a price that reflects the 
cost to the seller plus a fair profit (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). However, consumers 
are seldom privy to full information about costs and profits involved in price-setting practices 
(Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003). They respond, therefore, to market offerings based on 
available information and presumptions about how they believe prices are set and, therefore, 
what processes prices reflect. Although we know that consumers evaluate the fairness of offered 
prices (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003; Campbell 2007), we know little about how they evaluate 
the fairness of the processes marketers use in setting prices. 
Perceptions of price fairness (PPF) are “a consumer’s assessment and associated 
emotions of whether the difference, or lack of difference, between a seller’s price and the price 
of a comparative other party is reasonable, acceptable, or justifiable” (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 
2004, p. 3). Not surprising, a consumer is more likely to judge a higher-than-expected price to be 
more unfair than a lower price (Maxwell 2005; Huppertz, Arenson, and Evans 1978). However, 
consumers will judge prices as more fair when they perceive that higher prices reflect that the 
sellers’ costs and not the sellers’ relative profit levels have increased (Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1986), that sellers’ cost increases and price increases are in alignment (Bolton and Alba 
2006), and that factors outside the seller’s control have caused the higher prices (Vaidyanathan 
and Aggarwal 2003). Past research has identified influences of PPF (e.g., good seller reputation, 
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Campbell 1999a). PPF may also be enhanced when the consumer perceives that the seller set the 
price through a fair process. 
 
Procedural Fairness and Pervasiveness of Price-Setting Practices 
 
Consumers may have perceptions about how sellers determine prices, but because their 
information is limited, they are forced to judge the fairness of prices by comparing them with 
other prices—competitors’ prices, prices their friends have paid, or prices the customer has paid 
in the past. For example, Progressive Insurance Company advertises their car insurance by 
presenting prices compared with three competitors’ quotes. With limited additional information 
about how competitors’ prices were set, the consumer might misjudge the fairness of 
Progressive’s quote.  
On the other hand, if consumers had more information about how prices were set, they 
could more accurately judge the fairness of the sellers’ price-setting practices, or the fairness of 
the procedures the sellers used to set the prices. If consumers learned that their car insurance 
quotes were set according to their driving records, their vehicle models, and the number of miles 
they drive to and from work, they would probably perceive that insurance managers had set 
insurance quotes fairly, based on vehicle-related cues that inform of a potential client’s risk.  
What if consumers knew that car insurance managers set prices according to credit report 
scores? Although the Supreme Court ruled that the use of credit reports does not violate the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act and that insurance managers are not required to disclose use of credit 
reports in setting price (Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al. v Burr et al. 2007), consumers may not 
feel that the use of credit report scores aligns with vehicle-related cues; therefore, consumers 
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might perceive that the process for setting a price is unfair for insurance companies to use credit 
reports.  
In addition to the procedural fairness of a price-setting practice, consumers may also 
evaluate the commonness of use, or pervasiveness, of a price-setting practice in a given context. 
For example, they might view it as common practice for the health insurance industry to set a 
price quote based on medical history. However, setting a car insurance price quote based on 
medical history is not likely to be viewed as a common price-setting practice, and therefore 
consumers would likely find medical history to be an unacceptable price-setting practice for the 
car insurance industry.  
 
What are the Rules of Price Fairness? 
 
Our existing knowledge of consumers’ implicit rules for judging the fairness of price-
setting practices is somewhat limited. In Maxwell’s (2002) study on rule-based price fairness, 
social (price) fairness was defined as being “according to the rules.” The study shifted the focus 
from PPF (i.e., consumer judgments of the fairness of an offered price compared with another 
price) to the fairness of the seller’s price-setting practice (i.e., consumer judgments of the 
fairness of the process the seller used to set the price). Exploring what constituted fair price-
setting practices for the airline industry, the study identified rules by which consumers judged 
the fairness of price-setting practices by selecting price-setting practices that had high approval 
ratings (i.e., indicating acceptance by the population sampled). The study did not, however, 
confirm what makes a price-setting practice socially acceptable to consumers.  
Based on the premise that consumers vary in their knowledge of marketplace price-
setting practices, Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson (2007) developed a measurement of objective 
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knowledge of marketer pricing tactics. However, their studies did not indicate how consumers 
judge these price-setting practices in terms of fairness. The proposed research extends earlier 
research by empirically testing what makes a pricing rule acceptable to consumers by examining 
the overall procedural fairness of price-setting practices and the moderating effect of 
pervasiveness of the price-setting practice by context (i.e., the set of circumstances that surround 
the price-setting practice). 
 
The Multidimensionality of Price Fairness 
 
Much prior research has viewed PPF as a singular judgment (i.e., more fair – less fair) 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Campbell 1999a, b; Bolton and Alba 2006). A few 
researchers have suggested that price fairness has both affective and cognitive components, and 
that some pricing situations may elicit more emotional (i.e., affective) responses to offered 
prices, whereas others may elicit more thinking (i.e., cognitive) responses to offered prices (Xia, 
Monroe, and Cox 2004). In fact, Campbell (2007) found that affect plays an important role in 
PPF in that affect and inferred motive alternately mediate PPF. However, affect and cognition 
were not measured as part of a multidimensional PPF construct, but as separate constructs. Also, 
the influence of affect was not tested on response behaviors, such as complaining about the price.  
Studying the effects of fairness judgments on response behaviors is critical to sellers 
because it is negative consumer outcomes such as decisions not to purchase (Maxwell 2005; 
Grewal, Hardesty, and Iyer 2004; Maxwell 2002), reduced intentions to shop with that seller 
(Campbell 1999a, b), and complaining behavior (Kalapurakal, Dickson, and Urbany 1991) that 
affect businesses. Previous studies have examined response behaviors only as a result of price 
unfairness when, in fact, certain response behaviors may also depend on whether there is an 
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affective assessment or a cognitive assessment of PPF. Response behavior in which the 
consumer engages in self-protection behavior (e.g., complaining behavior, exiting the 
relationship) and revenge-seeking behavior (e.g., negative word-of-mouth) may be outcomes of 
affective PPF, whereas inaction (e.g., remaining loyal to the seller without complaining) may be 
an outcome of cognitive PPF (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004).  
 
Focus of this Research 
 
 In the price fairness literature, researchers have distinguished between the fairness of the 
process of setting prices (Maxwell 2002) and the perceived price fairness (PPF) of an offered 
price (Campbell 1999a, b; Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003). This research examines both 
procedural price fairness and PPF in two studies. The overarching objectives of these studies are:  
Study 1 – to determine price-setting practices that are more socially acceptable and less 
socially acceptable in the marketplace, and  
Study 2 – to measure the extent to which the social (un)acceptability of a price-setting 
practice affects perceptions of fairness of an offered price.  
 
Study 1. The first study measures the extent to which the overall procedural fairness of 
multiple price-setting practices and the pervasiveness of each price-setting practice in the 
marketplace of a given context are associated with the social acceptability of a price-setting 
practice. Also measured are important covariates, including the extent to which consumers think 
about how prices are set and consumer knowledge about how prices are set. The results reveal 
how overall procedural fairness and pervasiveness affect the social acceptability of a price-
setting practice, and provide manipulations for testing effects of deviating from an acceptable 
pricing rule (i.e., a price-setting practice that is socially acceptable to consumers) on perceptions 
of price fairness to be used in Study 2.  
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Study 2. The second study tests a model of outcome perceived price fairness, including 
the effects of seller use of a socially (un)acceptable process of price-setting on PPF. The 
measures of cognitive and affective assessments of outcome price fairness are developed, and 
included as part of the PPF construct in assessing the model. Consumer knowledge of marketer 
price-setting tactics is assessed as a covariate to PPF. Also measured is the proposed differential 
effects of type of PPF assessment (e.g., affective or cognitive) on consumer response behaviors. 
Specifically, the affective component of PPF is examined for effects on behaviors such as greater 
intention for self-protection and revenge-seeking behaviors, and the cognitive component of PPF 
is examined for effects on no-action behaviors. 
 
Contributions  
 
The proposed research responds to prior price fairness literature’s call for greater insight 
into consumers’ beliefs about price-setting practices and the effects of beliefs on judgments of 
price fairness (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). This research also 
builds on other recent research to better understand consumer marketplace knowledge (Wright, 
2002; Wright, Friestad, & Bousch, 2005) by learning about consumer knowledge of price-setting 
practices in the marketplace and how such knowledge affects price fairness judgments. The 
proposed studies expand on recent researchers’ studies of fair processes for setting price by 
determining what makes a price-setting practice socially acceptable (Maxwell 2002) and bridges 
the gap between studies of procedural price fairness and studies of outcome price fairness by 
examining effects of procedural fairness on outcome fairness. Finally, this research extends 
Campbell’s (2007) findings that affect does play a role in price fairness by developing measures 
of affective and cognitive price fairness assessments. Our understanding of the detrimental 
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impact of price unfairness perceptions are further enhanced by measuring effects of 
affective/cognitive price fairness assessments on consumer response behaviors.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the price fairness literature, marketplace knowledge 
about price-setting practices, and beliefs about the existence of social norms for sellers’ behavior 
in setting prices. It also discusses the proposed two-dimensional conception of price fairness and 
the literature on consumer response behaviors, including revenge-seeking, self-protection, and 
no-action. Chapter 2 includes a description of the proposed model of price fairness. Chapter 3 
describes the methods and results of the research. In Chapter 4, implications and limitations of 
the research are discussed, as well as suggestions for future research. The appendices conclude 
with tables, figures, charts, and references. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptualization 
 
Overview 
 
 This chapter reviews the extant literature related to consumers’ judgment of price fairness 
found in the marketing, psychology, and consumer economics literature, attending particularly to 
the revealed opportunities for future research related to consumers’ knowledge and beliefs about 
price-setting practices and resulting judgments about price fairness. In particular, the chapter 
focuses on the concepts of the existence of social norms in regard to price-setting practices and 
the potential impact of violations of such norms between consumers and sellers. This chapter 
demonstrates that although a few studies (Maxwell 2002; Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994) have 
initiated the concept of evaluating the fairness of the rules used in price-setting, a deeper 
understanding of the fairness of these rules is warranted, including determining whether a pricing 
rule is universally accepted, or whether pricing rules are accepted in specific contexts.  
In addition, the chapter explores the price fairness concept itself, specifically focusing on 
evidence for a multidimensional construct reflecting both affective and cognitive assessments 
rather than simple fair–unfair judgments. The limited research on the multidimensionality of 
price fairness will be highlighted as well as the opportunity to further develop the idea of an 
affective and a cognitive component of price fairness. Beyond the concept itself, the chapter 
further explores the literature on consumer response to price (un)fairness judgments, such as no-
action, self-protection, and revenge-seeking. 
 From this review, a model of the rules of fair pricing and price fairness is conceptualized, 
including effects of breaking a socially acceptable pricing rule on price fairness, the 
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multidimensionality of price fairness, and subsequent consumer response behavior. This model 
and the associated hypothesized relationships are also presented in this chapter.  
 
Perceptions of Price Fairness (PPF) 
 
Fairness has been thought of as “equity” and where consumers get “what is right” or 
“what they deserve” (Oliver and Swan 1989). “Fair” has come to be known as “a global measure 
of price acceptability” (Maxwell 1995) and perceived price fairness as a psychological factor that 
influences consumers’ reactions to prices (Campbell 1999a). For this research, the acronym PPF 
represents Xia, Monroe, and Cox’s (2004) definition of perception of price fairness: 
A consumer’s assessment and associated emotions of whether the difference, or lack of 
difference, between a seller’s price and the price of a comparative other party is 
reasonable, acceptable, or justifiable (p. 3).  
 
PPF has been examined in price decrease situations (Darke and Dahl 2003), price 
increase situations (Campbell 1999a; b; Bolton and Alba 2006), and both price increase and 
decrease situations (Campbell 2007). However, the current research examines PPF as a result of 
the price-setting practice, as exemplified by Haws and Bearden’s (2006) PPF study of online 
price-setting practices. 
Although conventional economic theory has suggested that consumers perceive lower 
prices as more fair (Maxwell 1995), a number of PPF studies have demonstrated that consumers’ 
reactions to price increases are based on the dual entitlement principle (Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1986; Urbany, Madden, and Dickson 1989; Frey and Pommerehne 1993). Dual 
entitlement maintains that (1) raising price to maintain profit is fair, (2) raising price to increase 
profits is not fair, and (3) maintaining price in the face of a cost decline is fair (Urbany, Madden, 
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and Dickson 1989). Thus, dual entitlement recognizes that sellers are due a fair profit and that 
once prices are set, sellers are not expected to pass along cost reductions to consumers.  
Studies of PPF have examined determinants and response behaviors of PPF. See Table 1 
for a summary of price fairness literature. Campbell found that lack of good reputation (1999a) 
brings about greater perceptions of price unfairness. When price increases are aligned with cost 
increases, judgments of price unfairness are reduced (Bolton & Alba, 2006). Consumer 
involvement in price setting, such as consumer bidding, increases PPF (Haws and Bearden 
2006). When the cause of the cost increase was external to the seller and the seller had low 
controllability, judgments of price were seen as more fair (Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). 
Studies of PPF have revealed negative perceptions of sellers’ reasons for a given price (e.g., 
inferred motive for price increase; Campbell 1999a, b; Kukar-Kinney, Xia, and Monroe 2005). 
PPF studies have also shown that prices set higher in response to special circumstances (e.g., 
scarcity or heightened demand) led to price unfairness judgments (Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1986; Frey and Pommerehne 1993; Maxwell 1995; Campbell 1999b). Each of these 
studies provided insight into the cues that consumers rely on for PPF, yet they did not address 
whether consumers hold beliefs about the rules of price-setting and how perceived violation of 
such rules affects PPF.  
 
Xia, Monroe, and Cox’s (2004) Conceptual Model of PPF 
 
Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004) conceptualized an overarching model of PPF, which is 
presented in  Figure 1. In this model, the authors suggested that consumers compare an offered 
price with another price (e.g., a price offered in the past or a price another consumer paid). 
Subsequently, they assessed price fairness by comparing one transaction with another, 
 11
attributions of responsibility for a price increase, the buyer-seller relationship stage (i.e., trust), 
and knowledge, beliefs, and social norms in the marketplace. They also conceptualized PPF as 
multidimensional, deriving from both cognitive and affective assessments. Separately, they 
suggested that this cognitive/affective assessment of PPF elicits negative emotions and perceived 
value judgments. Depending on the perceived cost of taking action and the relative power of the 
consumer and the seller, consumers were described as responding either with no action, self-
protection such as withdrawing from the transaction, or revenge seeking through active means 
such as taking legal action.  
Prior research has addressed some of the relationships delineated in Xia, Monroe, and 
Cox’s (2004) model as indicated in Figure 2. The white boxes represent research that has been 
conducted on specific areas defined in Xia and colleagues’ conceptual PPF model, whereas the 
black boxes are areas defined by Xia and colleagues that are yet to be fully examined. 
Specifically, what has not been fully explored is how consumers’ knowledge of and beliefs about 
the marketplace, in particular about how prices are set, affect their expectations of fair price-
setting practices. Although Maxwell’s research on social norms (1999) and on beliefs (2002) 
both examined effects on PPF, the current research furthers our understanding of beliefs, norms, 
and PPF. In addition, PPF has generally been treated as a single judgment of fair–unfair rather 
than a dimensional construct with cognitive and affective components as defined by Xia, 
Monroe, and Cox (2004). The current research seeks to address these issues.  
 
A Call for Research on Knowledge, Beliefs and Social Norms 
 
Among other things, PPF has been proposed to be a function of knowledge, beliefs, and 
norms. It has been suggested that consumers may “rely on their general knowledge or beliefs 
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about sellers’ practices to adjust their judgments of price fairness” (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). 
Indeed, Bolton, Warlop, and Alba (2003) discovered that available information to the consumer, 
such as information on costs and profits, affects perceptions of price fairness; however, they 
suggested further research on consumer knowledge and PPF: 
In our view, research on price fairness bridges the gap between product- and market- 
level knowledge, inasmuch as judgments about transaction fairness reflect consumer 
beliefs about marketplace dynamics (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003, p. 489).  
 
Other researchers have called for greater understanding of the impact of knowledge or beliefs on 
PPF. Campbell (1999b) suggested that it would be “useful to gain further understanding of 
consumers’ inferences about pricing and other market actions” (p. 198), and Haws and Bearden 
(2006) proposed that “consumer knowledge about pricing in general should be examined as a 
potential factor explaining fairness perceptions” (p. 309). Similarly, PPF may be shaped or 
refined by marketplace metacognition, the “everyday individual’s thinking about market-related 
thinking,” including beliefs pertaining to marketplace cooperation and manipulation (Wright 
2002, p. 677).  
It is important to differentiate consumer knowledge of marketplace price-setting practices 
from consumer price knowledge, which has been studied extensively in the marketing literature 
(for a review, see Estelami, Lehmann, and Holden 2001), and from long-term price knowledge 
measurement (see Vanhuele and Dreze 2002). Traditionally, consumer price knowledge has been 
assessed by the accuracy of consumers’ recall of prices with a variety of memory tests. Vanhuele 
and Dreze (2002) conceptualized price knowledge as a combination of recallable price 
knowledge, price recognition, and deal spotting. Although these measures are valuable for 
examining price awareness, this price knowledge construct does not tap the consumer’s beliefs 
about price-setting practices; it tests only recognition of accurate prices.  
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Evidence of consumers’ knowledge of price-setting practices in the marketplace has been 
provided by Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson (2007), who developed a measure of pricing tactic 
persuasion knowledge. This seventeen-item true-false index assessed the degree to which 
consumers understood the merchant’s intent behind a range of pricing practices. As such, the 
scale captured consumers’ beliefs about pricing tactics and marketers’ attempts to influence 
consumers through techniques such as captive pricing, loss leader pricing, price bundling, and 
price skimming. As an example, the pricing tactic persuasion knowledge index asked whether 
the following statement is true or false: “Everyday-low-pricing is used by marketers so that they 
will be perceived as having really low prices on some items and higher prices on others 
(FALSE).” The authors found that the index score moderated consumer reactions. Specifically, 
greater pricing tactic persuasion knowledge lessened the impact on consumer reactions 
associated with large quantity surcharges. These authors saw consumers’ knowledge of marketer 
persuasion tactics as a possible determinant of PPF.  
 Further research is warranted on what consumers believe about pricing in the 
marketplace. As Dickson and Kalapurakal (1994) correctly pointed out, much of the existent 
literature on fairness has assumed the fairness of specific rules but has not directly established 
consumers’ perceived fairness of rules. Determining what makes a price-setting practice socially 
acceptable and establishing which price-setting practices are socially acceptable in the 
marketplace (i.e., the “rules” of fair pricing) are essential to better understand consumer beliefs 
about pricing in the marketplace.  
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Distributive Justice and Procedural Justice 
 
Distributive justice looks at the fairness of an outcome; procedural justice looks at the 
fairness of the process through which the outcome is achieved (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996). 
In a review article on procedural and distributive justice, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) 
described procedural justice as, among other things, procedures that are consistent, that are 
without self-interest, and that have represented interests of all concerned parties. On the other 
hand, past price fairness research has exemplified distributive justice by looking at the fairness of 
the price itself, or price as an outcome (Campbell 1999a, b). Limited research has focused on the 
perceived fairness of pricing, or the process by which the price is set. The current research first 
examines the fairness of price-setting as a process (i.e., procedural fairness) and then examines 
effects of procedural fairness on PPF (i.e., distributive fairness). Thus, this research extends past 
PPF research by examining effects of procedural fairness on PPF.  
An extension of distributive versus procedural justice is a concept of dual-focused 
thought described by Escalas and Luce (2004). Individuals’ use of either process-focused 
thoughts or outcome-focused thoughts influences behavior intentions. For example, when 
viewing an advertisement, consumers can either think about the process of using a product in 
their everyday lives (e.g., using shampoo A every day) or they can think about the outcome of 
using the product (e.g., having beautiful, clean hair as a result of using shampoo A). Escalas and 
Luce (2004) showed that manipulating process-focused thought can lead to greater desirable 
behavioral intentions, because process-focused thought creates an achievable plan for product 
usage. In the same manner, consumers may judge the fairness of a price solely on the price 
presented (i.e., the outcome), without thinking about how the seller set the price, or the consumer 
may judge the fairness of a price by thinking about how the seller set the price (i.e., the process). 
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The current research proposes that consumers may use process-focused thought when evaluating 
the fairness of a price-setting practice (i.e., when information about how the seller set the price is 
apparent) and use outcome-focused thought when evaluating the fairness of an offered price. A 
perceived unfair price may be the result of a consumer evaluating the seller’s perceived 
adherence to or failure to use a socially acceptable price-setting practice during the process of 
setting the price. 
 
Social Norms and Procedural Price Fairness 
 
Perceptions of the fairness of pricing practices may be viewed as a function of social 
norms (Maxwell 1995; 1999; 2002). In an exploratory study, consumers provided their own 
words to describe what a “fair price” means (Maxwell 1995). The resulting themes funneled into 
two distinct components of price fairness: economic and social (Maxwell 1995). Whereas the 
economic component was evidenced by the classic Marshallian economic theory, which suggests 
that maximizing utility results in the cheapest price being judged as “fairest,” the social 
component reflected that price fairness includes the belief that prices are affordable to everyone 
or that marketers are not taking advantage of the consumer at the set price (Maxwell 1995). The 
findings of Maxwell’s (1995) study also suggested that PPF is not just about the fairness of the 
price to the individual, but the fairness of the price to consumers as a community. Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) also suggested that implicit rules or community standards of fairness 
help shape conduct in the market. These normative “rules of fairness” are socially acceptable, 
and deviations from these rules bring about PPF and resultant consequences. Although sellers 
may have the prerogative to change prices, they may be held to consumer acceptance through 
unspoken social rules of the exchange (Maxwell 2002).  
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Maxwell (1999) performed a classification of social norms of economic exchange, among 
which are “decentralized” norms (i.e., shared expectations suggest how each group member must 
behave within the exchange), “hegemonic” norms (i.e., a less powerful party must behave as 
expected by a more powerful party in order for an exchange to occur), and “cooperative” norms 
(i.e., two parties collaborate to facilitate their transactional relationship). Whereas hegemonic 
and cooperative norms are typical of relational exchange (e.g., inter-firm transaction market), 
decentralized norms are more typical of discrete exchange (e.g., consumer market) (Maxwell 
1999). These decentralized norms are shared expectations of how others “ought” to behave and 
are enforced by consumers’ approval or disapproval, developed over time, and are influenced by 
traditions, beliefs, and routines (Maxwell 1999). According to these decentralized norms, sellers’ 
setting of prices would be a function of, and mitigated by, the practices of others in the 
marketplace, further promoting the norms. As an example, Maxwell pointed to the practice of 
prices ending in “9.” The original purpose was to force clerks to use cash registers to ring up 
sales, making it more difficult for them to pocket the money (Maxwell 1999). Now, however, 
sales tax forces sales clerks to ring up sales on registers anyway. The functional purpose of 
prices ending in “9” is no longer valid; however, the practice pervades today such that prices 
ending in “round numbers” may be unexpected (Maxwell 1999).  
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) discussed unfair pricing practices and pricing 
practices that have become norms, but their study did not explicitly identify or test actual rules of 
fairness. Two studies in the price fairness literature have, however, examined the fairness of 
price-setting rules (Maxwell 2002; Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994). 
Maxwell (2002) provided evidence that social norms of price-setting practices exist in a 
study of “rule-based” price fairness. Social fairness of the pricing process was described 
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separately from social fairness of the outcome, in this case, of the price itself. “The rules” were 
described as patterns of exchange between two parties; over time these rules become 
institutionalized and constrain behavior (Maxwell 2002, p. 193). Two studies investigated (1) the 
effects of consumers’ beliefs of adherence to the pricing rule on attitudes and willingness to buy, 
and (2) the effects of revealing a negative price-setting practice with a justification rule (i.e., 
“everybody does it”) on price perceptions and willingness to purchase.  
In the second study (Maxwell 2002), belief about adherence to the rules was not directly 
tested for effects on PPF. Instead, adherence to the rule was manipulated by describing how an 
airline ticket price is set using cost-plus pricing (i.e., a price-setting practice that is assumed to 
adhere to the rule) or yield pricing (i.e., a price-setting practice that is assumed to deviate from 
the rule). This manipulation of adherence to the rule was found to affect price perceptions. The 
justification of rule (i.e., “everybody does it”) was unexpectedly not found to significantly affect 
price perceptions, perhaps because of the context of the study (i.e., the airline industry). 
Although this study distinguished between procedural fairness (i.e., rule-based fairness) and 
outcome fairness (PPF), limitations (e.g., limited examples of price-setting practice rules 
examined, the assumptions of whether a price-setting practice is socially acceptable, and the 
unexpected null effects of justification of rule on price perceptions) present opportunities for 
further examination of social acceptability of price-setting practices and subsequent effect on 
PPF.  
Pervasiveness. The perceived pervasiveness of a price-setting practice may differ by 
contexts with some practices common in one arena but unheard of in another. Although 
Maxwell’s (2002) study of rule-based pricing used the airline industry, it was based in part on a 
study of fairness of price-setting rules in another context, the bulk electricity market (Dickson 
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and Kalapurakal 1994). This earlier study used actual price-setting practices as well as frequency 
of use in the bulk electricity market. Traders in the industry provided the price-setting practices 
and provided fairness judgments for each rule. Eight price-setting practices were evaluated in 
total, four categorized as “cost-based rules” (e.g., cost plus pricing) and four categorized as 
“market-based rules” (e.g., seller increases price when supply decreases). Results of this study 
indicated that frequency of use of the rule correlates with judgments of fairness; however, it did 
not provide evidence of how consumers might judge the practices. The results contradicted the 
dual entitlement principle in that price increases as a function of heightened demand were 
evaluated as less fair. These contradicting results to the dual entitlement principle may be 
because they were sellers’ judgments, not consumers', and also because the study was context 
specific (i.e., bulk electricity market). These results are not assumed to be generalizable to 
consumers or to other industries. 
 
The Multidimensionality of Perceived Price Fairness 
 
 Though commonly approached as a unidimensional judgment (i.e., fair–unfair), PPF may 
be driven by a combination of affective and cognitive assessment of a price, such that affective 
and cognitive assessments are precursors to the unidimensional judgment. Xia, Monroe, and Cox 
(2004) suggested in their definition that price fairness is a “consumer’s assessment” (i.e., 
cognitive) and “associated emotions” (i.e., affective) (p. 3), though the affective and cognitive 
components of price fairness are not to be confused with the emotion or perceived value 
consequence of PPF as described in Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004). Affective and cognitive 
assessments are part of the PPF, and emotions and perceived value can be elicited from PPF. 
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Xia and colleagues suggested that not only do consumers have cognitions about the price 
equality or inequality, they may also have emotional, or affective judgments about price as well. 
Feelings of unease, guilt, anger, or outrage may accompany cognitive PPF. Not clear in their 
definition is whether both components (i.e., cognitive and affective) must always exist with PPF 
or whether their existence or relative impact on PPF may vary by context.  
Some disagreement has appeared in the literature as to when emotion is activated in PPF. 
Xia, Monroe, and Cox (2004) suggested that the construct of PPF includes an affective 
component, implying that the emotion is present in, or concurrent with, the fairness judgment of 
the price. The authors also proposed that emotions are elicited from PPF, and actually act as a 
mediator for consumer response behavior. Clear evidence has been given of emotional effects of 
price-setting practices (i.e., excitement: Babin, Hardesty, and Suter 2003), and emotion effects 
on preference for prices (i.e., sadness and disgust: Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004).  
Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) suggested that affective and cognitive assessment occur in 
decision making. The first is an automatic response, likely to give rise to affective reactions; 
whereas the second is a deliberate, controlled response, likely to give rise to cognitive reactions 
(Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Rottenstreich, Sood, and Brenner (2007) also supported the idea that 
consumer choice includes two assessments. Borrowing from Kahneman and Frederick (2002), 
they described two systematic responses in evaluation, which are similar to Shiv and Fedorikhin 
(1999). System 1 response (i.e., affective) is automatic, rapid, and affective; System 2 response 
(i.e., cognitive) is controlled, slow, and deductive.  
The current research posits that cognitive and affective assessments may be concurrent in 
price fairness judgments (PPF). Depending on the information cues present, either the cognitive 
assessment or the affective component will dominate the other in the judgment. For example, 
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Shiv and Fedorhkin (1999) demonstrated that manipulating the availability of mental processing 
resources (e.g., memorizing a series of one-digit numbers versus a series of two-digit numbers) 
in a binary choice decision produced differences in affective and cognitive assessments. 
Specifically, when consumers’ mental processing resources were restricted (i.e., memorizing the 
series of two-digit numbers), decisions relied more heavily on an affective assessment; in less 
restrictive conditions (i.e., memorizing the series of one-digit numbers), they relied more on 
cognitive assessment. In terms of PPF, Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) research suggested that the 
dominance of affective and cognitive assessments may differ across contexts. The important 
question is—under what conditions will these different assessment processes occur?  
Recently, Campbell (2007) examined the cognitive and affective assessment as mediators 
of PPF, and therefore antecedents to PPF. Using Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) distinction 
between cognition and affect, Campbell (2007) found that inferences about the seller’s motive 
had greater influence on price unfairness when cognitive processing resources were available, 
and affect had greater influence on PPF when cognitive resources were limited. Also, the 
measurement for affect and inferred motive were measures distinct from PPF; therefore 
Campbell (2007) did not test a multidimensionality of PPF itself. Her research also did not 
explore whether cognitive and affective effects on PPF had differential effects on response 
behavior variables (e.g., no-action, self-protection, revenge-seeking). 
 
PPF Effects on Consumer Response Behavior 
 
A model of response behaviors associated with dissatisfaction, initiated by Hirschman 
(1970) and extended by Singh (1990), provided guidance for the effects of PPF. The model’s 
premise was that a customer has four potential responses to a dissatisfactory purchase 
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experience: exiting, voicing, remaining loyal (i.e., no-action), or spreading negative word-of-
mouth (WOM) (Hirschman 1970; Singh 1990). By exiting, the customer severs the relationship 
with the selling firm. The customer who activates the voice option indicates a desire to change 
the undesirable situation and to seek satisfaction. Remaining loyal is not synonymous with 
staying “faithful” or adhering “to a course of action”; rather Hirschman (1970) characterized 
loyalty as the omission of exiting and voicing. Loyalty in this sense is passive; it is inaction. 
Negative WOM involves spreading the word to others (not the seller) about the dissatisfactory 
experience (Singh 1990). Although the PPF literature has declared that perceptions of price 
unfairness are not equivalent to dissatisfaction (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004), such perceptions 
are still negative judgments about a transaction experience, and therefore the Hirschman–Singh 
model of response behaviors can be adapted to understanding response behaviors to PPF.  
An extension of the exit, voice, loyalty, and WOM dissatisfaction response behaviors 
could be the response behaviors to PPF, as outlined in Xia, Monroe, and Cox’s (2004) 
conceptual model of PPF, shown in Figure 1. Xia and colleagues (2004) classified consumer 
behavioral responses to PPF into three categories: no action, self-protection, and revenge. Figure 
2 shows the research that has examined these different consequences of PPF. No action 
behaviors (cf., Hirschman–Singh’s loyalty) are situations in which the consumer does not act to 
bring equality back to the transaction or change future transactions with the seller, even if the 
consumer perceives the price as unfair (Monroe and Xia 2006). Self-protection behaviors (cf., 
Hirschman–Singh’s exit or voice) include responses that the consumer undertakes to restore 
equality to the transaction. Revenge behaviors (cf., Hirschman–Singh’s spreading negative 
WOM) are intended to damage the seller in efforts to “get even” (Monroe and Xia 2006).  
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The PPF literature has given the most attention to self-protection as response behaviors to 
PPF. Specifically, PPF has been linked to shopping and purchase intentions (Maxwell 2005; 
Homburg, Hoyer, and Koschate 2005; Xia and Monroe 2005; Grewal, Hardesty, and Iyer 2004; 
Campbell 1999a, b; Kalapurakal, Dickson, and Urbany 1991). Response behaviors of PPF 
examined in other research can be found in Table 1. Only two studies (Xia and Monroe 2005; 
Urbany, Madden, and Dickson 1989) have examined price fairness effects on no-action 
behaviors and revenge-seeking behaviors. Also, within the self-protection category, limited 
research has been conducted on effects of PPF on complaining behavior (Huppertz, Arenson, and 
Evans 1978).  
Urbany, Madden, and Dickson (1989) found that even though consumers judged a price 
to be unfair, they did not necessarily intend to switch retailers (i.e., exit the relationship). Instead 
they preferred to continue their relationship as usual (i.e., no-action), perhaps because the 
switching costs may have been too great, or they had come to terms with the new price. On the 
other hand, in situations of revenge, the consumer may have sought to punish the seller by 
switching to another seller even at the consumer’s expense (Bechwati and Morrin 2003) or by 
spreading negative WOM in efforts to “get even” (Monroe and Xia 2006).  
 Singh (1990) empirically tested the Hirschman–Singh model of consumer response 
behaviors and found that the consumers’ beliefs about the probability of successful complaint, 
worthwhileness of complaint, and consumer sophistication all positively influenced actual 
complaining, exiting, and spreading of WOM. Although Xia and Monroe (2005) found that 
perceived price unfairness increased desire to spread negative WOM as mediated by negative 
emotions, to our knowledge, no PPF studies have examined effects of the multidimensionality of 
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PPF on response behaviors. Specifically, how does affective assessment of price fairness 
influence consumer response behaviors differently from cognitive assessment of price fairness? 
 
Summary of Literature Review 
 
 Limited research has been conducted to understand the way consumers think about the 
marketplace, including consumers’ beliefs about marketplace practices. Most previous PPF 
literature has focused on the distributive justice interpretation of PPF, where the outcome of an 
offered price is judged for fairness. Little research has been done on procedural price fairness, or 
the judgments about the fairness of price-setting practices. Maxwell (2002) demonstrated that 
consumers may be judging the fairness of a price based on the rule used by the seller to set the 
price (i.e., procedural price fairness). However, it is unclear as to what makes a price-setting 
practice rule acceptable to society: Is it procedural pricing fairness alone or does pervasiveness 
of the practice by context play a role? The effects of use or misuse of a socially acceptable price-
setting practice on PPF are yet to be tested. 
Previous research has revealed that perceptions of sellers’ motive in setting a price and 
special circumstances (e.g., scarcity or heightened demand) have been linked to PPF and 
subsequent effects on consumer response behavior (e.g., purchase intentions) (Campbell 1999b; 
Kalapurakal, Dickson, and Urbany 1991; Xia and Monroe 2005). However, this review of the 
literature uncovers aspects we still do not understand about PPF. Although affect may play a role 
in PPF (Campbell 2007), no research has been conducted on multiple dimensions of PPF, 
including components of cognitive and affective assessments. Although some self-protection 
response behaviors to PPF have been studied extensively (e.g., shopping intentions), limited 
research has been conducted on no-action and revenge-seeking response behaviors to PPF. These 
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response behaviors have received insufficient examination in the literature and have not been 
examined as consequences of a multidimensional PPF (e.g., affective/cognitive) where some 
response behaviors may be results of affective PPF and others results of cognitive PPF. This 
research is intended to fill these gaps in the literature and advance our understanding of price 
fairness, both as a process and as an outcome.  
 
 A Model of the Rules of Fair Pricing and PPF 
 
 In the next section, a model of the rules of fair pricing and PPF, including hypothesized 
relationships, is presented. Figure 3 illustrates the model. Specifically, perceived overall 
procedural fairness, moderated by perceived pervasiveness of price-setting practice by context, is 
posited to determine social acceptability of a price-setting practice. The effect of a seller’s 
decision to use a socially unacceptable price-setting practice to set a price will be hypothesized 
to bring about greater perceptions of price unfairness and, more specifically, to bring about 
greater affective assessment of PPF. Negative affective assessment of PPF and negative 
cognitive assessment of PPF are each argued to influence revenge-seeking, self-protection, and 
no-action behaviors.  
 
Determining the Rules of Fair Pricing 
 
 Dickson and Kalapurakal’s (1994) study demonstrated a means to assess fairness of eight 
price-setting practice rules within a specific context. Building from these rules and investigating 
beliefs within other industries could help to determine whether some price-setting rules are seen 
as universally fair in the consumer marketplace or whether rules vary by context. Specifically, 
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the overall procedural fairness of the price-setting practice may be moderated by perceived 
pervasiveness of the practice in a context that may then determine a socially acceptable price-
setting practice rule, or social norm.  
Maxwell’s (2002) study of rule-based fair pricing examined the beliefs about fairness of a 
price-setting practice in the airline industry. Through focus groups and open-ended surveys, she 
selected cost-based pricing as an “acceptable” rule of pricing for the airline industry. Indeed, 
analysis of her model of rule-based fair price resulted in inferred pricing fairness being a 
significant predictor of overall fairness of price-setting practices. Similarly, the overall 
procedural fairness of a price-setting practice was posited to lead to the social acceptability of the 
price-setting practice. 
In a review on reference prices, Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha (2005) discussed mental 
representations of reference price, suggesting that internal reference prices (i.e., price 
information in memory) may be encoded in memory as numeric and nonnumeric forms such as 
price beliefs. For example, not only could a precise quantitative price be an internal reference 
price, but so could the price belief that a brand of laundry detergent is frequently on sale 
(Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005). In discussions of psychological pricing, Monroe (1973) talked 
about the phenomena that buyers tend to expect certain prices after being exposed to them over 
time, an observation that may also apply to exposure of price-setting practices. Price beliefs, or 
expectations of sellers’ use of a price-setting practice, may be created from repeated exposure to 
a seller’s use of a price-setting practice in the marketplace (e.g., brand of detergent frequently on 
sale) over time. The repeated exposure to and expectation of a seller’s use of a price-setting 
practice could also heighten perceptions of the commonness or the pervasiveness of the price-
setting practice, which may lead to social acceptability of the price-setting practice.  
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In this research, pervasiveness is posited to affect whether the price-setting practice is 
accepted as a social norm in the marketplace. When a price-setting practice is thought to be 
pervasive within a given context, the consumer is expressing belief that the price-setting practice 
is commonly used for setting prices in the marketplace. Although it is plausible that the overall 
procedural fairness of the price-setting practice may bring about the social acceptability of the 
price-setting practice, the perceived pervasiveness of the price-setting practice may moderate the 
relationship between overall procedural fairness and social acceptability of the price-setting 
practice. Specifically, the perceived commonness or pervasiveness of the practice used in a 
context may strengthen a low procedural fairness judgment. Figure 4 illustrates the hypothesized 
moderating effect of pervasiveness. Thus, the hypothesis states: 
H1: Whereas high overall procedural fairness will be seen as more socially acceptable 
than low overall procedural fairness, perceived pervasiveness of the price-setting practice 
for a given context will moderate the relationship between overall procedural fairness and 
social acceptability: (1) when procedural fairness is low, pervasiveness will have a direct 
positive effect on social acceptability, and (2) when procedural fairness is high, 
pervasiveness will have no effect on social acceptability.  
 
 
Covariates - Socially Acceptable Price-Setting Rule  
 
The results of Bolton, Warlop, and Alba’s (2003) multiple studies suggested that 
consumers have a difficult time mentally assessing seller costs and profits, and that consumers 
have inaccurate perceptions of seller costs and profits. This may mean that consumers do not 
possess adequate information about how prices are set, or consumers may not think much about 
how prices are set. The more knowledgeable consumers are about how prices are set and the 
extent to which consumers think about price-setting practices (e.g., price-setting consciousness) 
may bring about differences in determining social acceptability of a price-setting practice. Also, 
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consumers’ familiarity with the context in which a price-setting practice is used may also 
influence the social acceptability of a practice. 
 
Effect of Breaking a Socially Acceptable Price-Setting Rule on PPF 
 
Bolton, Warlop, and Alba (2003) measured PPF as a result of price-setting strategy. They 
found that access to additional information about how prices are set, such as information about 
sellers’ costs and profits, can either positively or negatively affect PPF, depending on the kind of 
profit or cost information provided. For example, information that revealed a price was set 
according to costs attributable to reducing risk led to lower PPF than information that revealed a 
price was set according to costs attributable to quality. In the same way, consumer knowledge 
that a seller used a price-setting practice that is not socially acceptable to set an offered price 
should lead to greater perceptions of price unfairness.  
Haws and Bearden (2006) discussed the “rules” of price-setting. They described the 
fairness heuristic theory that once consumers accepted a pricing rule and judged the rule as fair, 
subsequent transactions utilizing the pricing rule should also be judged as fair. When a price-
setting practice is a norm or is socially acceptable, consumers then expect that price-setting 
practice will continue to be used to set prices for a particular context. When sellers continue to 
use this pricing rule, it reinforces the acceptability of the price-setting practice, whereas failure to 
use an acceptable practice would be seen as a break in expectations. If the consumer expected a 
subsequent transaction to have been set by a socially acceptable rule, but the rule was, instead, 
violated, perceptions of price unfairness would be expected to follow. Therefore, 
H2: A seller’s use of a socially unacceptable price-setting practice (i.e., “breaking a rule”) 
will bring about greater perceptions of price unfairness than use of a socially acceptable 
price-setting practice. 
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The Multidimensionality of PPF 
 
Affective assessment and cognitive assessment are two components of PPF (Xia, 
Monroe, and Cox 2004). PPF judgments may be a two-fold mental process. Drawing on Shiv and 
Fedorikhin’s (1999) and Rottenstreich, Sood, and Brenner’s (2007) two modes of consumer 
decision making, an outcome price fairness judgment1 (i.e., fair–unfair) is the result of cognitive 
and affective mental processing of price fairness. Table 2 outlines the differences between the 
two mental processing modes. The cognitive assessment is more slowly developed and is rule-
based, deliberative, and deductive. The affective assessment is the automatic, feeling-based, 
emotional evaluation. This assessment is reflexive; the consumer would not have much control 
over the affective, unlike the cognitive assessment.  
Researchers have found support that affective mental processing is dominant in certain 
situations, and cognitive mental processing is dominant in other situations (Shiv and Fedorikhin 
1999; Rottenstreich, Sood, and Brenner 2007). In situations that cause an emotional (i.e., 
affective) response to a price change, the affective assessment is expected to be dominant in 
determining outcome PPF. When the affective assessment is triggered, the mental processing 
capacity may be dominated or occupied with this assessment, limiting capacity for cognitive 
assessment. When a seller uses a socially unacceptable practice, an emotional response may be 
triggered (e.g., “that’s not fair!”). In this situation, the affective assessment may dominate the 
cognitive assessment in determining outcome perceptions of price (un)fairness. In other words, 
when the affective assessment dominates the cognitive assessment, the impact of affective 
                                                 
1 Outcome price fairness perception (outcome PPF) is equivalent to the generally accepted measure of price fairness 
perceptions (i.e., fair–unfair) (Campbell 1999a, b; Urbany, Madden, and Dickson 1989). 
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assessment on outcome PPF is strengthened and the impact of cognitive assessment is lessened 
on outcome PPF. Thus, 
H3: The impact of affective assessment on outcome PPF will be greater and the impact of 
cognitive assessment on outcome PPF will be less when a seller sets a price using a 
socially unacceptable price-setting practice (i.e., “breaking a rule”) than when a seller 
sets a price using a socially acceptable price-setting practice.  
 
 
Effects of Negative Affective Assessment on Response Behaviors 
 
High negative affective assessments of PPF may influence consumer response to 
outcome PPF. Research has shown that dissatisfied customers who are emotionally charged or 
who believe they have been treated unfairly may seek to restore equality (Bougie, Pieters, and 
Zeelenberg 2003) or seek retribution for perceived injustice (Bechwati and Morrin 2003). In fact, 
Xia and Monroe (2005) found support for perceptions of price unfairness leading to increased 
intention to spread negative WOM (e.g., revenge-response behavior), as mediated by negative 
emotions. Negative affective assessment will influence some self-protection behaviors in 
response to an unfair price. The negative feelings about the price may motivate the consumer to 
ask for a refund or to complain to the manager. Negative affective assessment may bring about 
more self-protection behaviors and revenge-seeking behaviors, and fewer no-action behaviors. 
Thus the hypothesis is proposed:  
H4: Affective assessments of PPF will affect consumer response behaviors. Specifically, 
when affective assessment of PPF is negative, consumers will be more likely to engage in 
self-protection behaviors and revenge-seeking behaviors, and less likely to engage in no-
action behaviors.  
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Effect of Negative Cognitive Assessment on Response Behaviors 
 
 The mental processing involved in negative affective assessment may block consumers’ 
capacity to entertain thoughts about the possible repercussions of revenge-seeking behavior, 
while the mental processing involved in negative cognitive assessment may allow consumers the 
capacity to think through their actions and decide to calculatively perform self-protection 
behaviors to seek restitution for the unfair price (i.e., self-protection behavior), or to refrain from 
responding to the unfair price (i.e., no-action behavior). Negative cognitive assessment of price 
unfairness may enable the consumer to think through the potential result of self-protection 
behaviors such as complaining or asking for a refund. If the consumer decides one of these self-
protection behaviors may bring equality back to the transaction (e.g., the manager gives a 
refund), then the consumer may partake in the self-protection behavior. Additionally, as Urbany, 
Madden, and Dickson (1989) discovered in their study of ATM premiums, not all unfair prices 
result in active consumer response behavior. Consumers may think about the costs involved in 
switching retailers and decide the cost is too high. Consumers may also think that their voice is 
too small to be heard and decide to keep quiet about the unfair price. Therefore:  
H5: Cognitive assessments of PPF will affect consumer response behaviors. Specifically, 
when cognitive assessment of PPF is negative, consumers will be more likely to engage 
in self-protection behaviors and no-action behaviors, and less likely to engage in revenge-
seeking behaviors.  
 
Covariate - PPF 
 
The objective knowledge a consumer brings to the marketplace transaction may influence 
outcome PPF. When consumers have higher levels of knowledge about market price-setting 
practices, they may be more likely to think that the seller has the power and opportunity to 
manipulate prices, or adversely, they may be more willing to judge the price as fair because they 
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better understand the processes the seller must follow in setting the price. When consumers have 
lower levels of knowledge about price-setting practices, they may not know about liberties that 
sellers have in setting prices, and may believe that the manufacturer, the economy, or some other 
outside force forced the seller to increase prices. However, low-knowledge consumers may judge 
a price as unfair because they do not understand the price-setting process and may fear that the 
seller is just out to make a higher profit. To determine whether consumer knowledge of price-
setting practices produces differences in PPF, such knowledge is measured as a covariate. 
The consumer familiarity of context in which the price-setting practice is used may 
influence outcome PPF. Those consumers who have low familiarity with the context may inflate 
their judgments of price unfairness because they are not familiar with prices or pricing in the 
marketplace. 
Covariate - Response Behaviors 
 
Richins’s (1983) research examined consumer assertion and aggression in consumer–
seller interactions in the marketplace. She suggested that assertiveness and aggressiveness may 
influence consumer response behaviors, such as shoplifting, to unfavorable interactions with 
sellers. Consumer assertion and aggression may also influence consumer responses to price 
fairness. Specifically, consumers who are high in assertion may be more likely to partake in self-
protection behaviors, and consumers who are high in aggression may be more likely to partake in 
revenge-seeking behaviors.  
 
Summary 
 
 The previous section described the research questions in response to the PPF literature’s 
call for greater understanding of consumer beliefs about the marketplace and of how those 
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beliefs affect PPF. Specifically, the social acceptability of a price-setting practice is posited to be 
the combined effects of beliefs of overall procedural fairness of a price-setting practice and 
beliefs about the pervasiveness of a price-setting practice in a given context. A seller’s decision 
to follow a socially unacceptable rule is hypothesized to bring about judgments of outcome price 
unfairness, to strengthen the affective component of PPF, and to weaken the cognitive 
component of PPF. Finally, consumer response behaviors to outcome judgments of price 
unfairness, such as self-protection, revenge-seeking, and no-action, are hypothesized to be 
influenced by negative affective and negative cognitive assessments of price unfairness.  
 The next chapter provides a discussion of the methods and results that tested the posited 
hypotheses. Two studies are described. The first study examined social acceptability of multiple 
price-setting practices, capturing overall procedural fairness and perceived pervasiveness within 
multiple contexts. The results of the first study provided treatments to test the model of the rules 
of fair pricing and outcome PPF in the second study. The second study employed an experiment 
to test effects of social unacceptability of a price-setting practice on outcome PPF, the 
multidimensionality of PPF, and subsequent consumer response behaviors. 
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Chapter 3: Method and Results 
 
 The objectives of this research are, again, to extend prior research in the area of social 
norms associated with price-setting practices and to examine the relationship between the social 
(un)acceptability of a price-setting practice and perceived price fairness (PPF). These objectives 
are pursued within an extended PPF model that examines PPF as a multidimensional construct 
with both cognitive and affective aspects that may be differentially affected by given price-
setting practices. Subsequently, these price-setting practices may bring about specific consumer-
response behaviors (e.g., revenge-seeking, self-protection, and no-action). The extended model 
tested is presented in Figure 3.  
To begin, we first must understand what makes a price-setting practice socially 
acceptable, and determine which price-setting practices are, in fact, socially acceptable (i.e., “the 
rules of fair pricing”). Assuming that consumers’ rules depend not only on the procedural 
fairness of the practice but are modified by their context, we examine the effects of “breaking the 
rules” by manipulating the price-setting practice and context to produce socially unacceptable 
price-setting responses. The hypothesized effects of socially unacceptable price-setting practices 
on cognitive and affective assessments of PPF, and subsequently on response behaviors, are then 
tested.  
This chapter includes a description of the methods used to pursue these areas. Study 1 is 
first described, including the development of a list of price-setting practices, and the ratings of 
procedural fairness, perceived pervasiveness, and social acceptability for each practice. Study 2 
is also described, including the experiment that manipulates procedural fairness and 
pervasiveness of a price-setting practice, derived from Study 1. This experiment is a 2 (i.e., 
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procedurally fair practice/procedurally unfair practice) by 2 (i.e., pervasive practice/not 
pervasive practice).  
Study 1: Determining the Rules of Fair Pricing 
Method 
 
Study 1 explores multiple price-setting practices in the marketplace today. For each, the 
question is whether consumers consider the price-setting practices to be procedurally fair overall 
and whether their acceptability as a price-setting practice is simply a function of that procedural 
fairness or is contextual (i.e., whether it is a function of the pervasiveness, or common practice, 
for a given product or service). As such, this work extends the studies of Maxwell (2002) and 
Dickson and Kalapurakal (1994) by assessing not just consumers’ perceptions of fairness, but 
also the perceived pervasiveness of each price-setting practice across a more comprehensive set 
of price-setting practices and in several contexts beyond the airline industry and bulk-electricity 
market. The results of this initial study provide key information about the practices that may 
“break the rules” (i.e., may be socially unacceptable) and thus affect PPF and its consequences. 
Information about consumers’ views of sellers’ pricing behaviors includes the degree to which 
certain practices may be comparably viewed across contexts. It also provides insight into how to 
“promote” price-setting practices or price increases that may preclude negative consumer 
reaction.  
Price-setting practices certainly vary across contexts (e.g., negotiable pricing for real 
estate, bundle pricing for communication products) and consumers may use the commonality of 
that practice, in part, to judge its acceptability. Determining the generalizability of price-setting 
practices requires assessment across an array of products/services within the marketplace. For 
example, the studies of Maxwell (2002) and Dickson and Kalapurakal (1994) took place in 
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highly regulated and competitive industries, and Dickson and Kalapurakal focused only on 
perceived fairness among industrial buyers. Thus, their research provided limited insight into 
consumer differences across contexts and across a broader range of price-setting practices. For 
example, in a traditional retail store, consumers generally expect set prices for merchandise with 
changes made to reflect sales, special promotions, coupons, or even stock clearances. They 
would probably not expect to negotiate prices as they might at an auction or at a swap meet. 
They would also probably not expect to see dynamic pricing strategies, such as yield 
management, though they may be aware that other products or services (e.g., hotels and airlines) 
set prices this way. Thus, as hypothesized, consumers would be expected to have beliefs about 
the procedural fairness of a general price-setting practice that would be mitigated by its context 
(i.e., pervasiveness of a given product or service).  
Development of Price-Setting Practices. To generate a list of fair price-setting practices, a 
list of extant price-setting practices was first compiled. The starting point was to review the 
pricing and price fairness literature and select unique price-setting practices that met the 
following criteria. First, the price-setting practice could not be described as one in which the 
seller was obviously taking advantage of the consumer, because this selling practice would lead 
to predictable results. The practice must be about price-setting in general, not just price increases 
or decreases. The price-setting practice must be limited to only one pricing strategy. For 
example, Dickson and Kalapurakal’s (1994) research examined the fairness of two pricing 
strategies with the dual entitlement principle, meaning respondents were asked to judge the 
fairness of both raising the price when the seller’s costs increased (i.e., pricing strategy 1), and 
keeping the price constant as the seller’s costs decreased (i.e., pricing strategy 2).  
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The starting set was derived from Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson’s (2007) seventeen-
item pricing tactic persuasion knowledge scale, Dickson and Kalapurakal’s (1994) price-setting 
practices including demand and supply pricing, and Maxwell’s (2002) examples from the pricing 
literature of cost-plus pricing and yield management. Table 3 presents the possible price-setting 
practices, including descriptions, from multiple pricing and price fairness studies. 
Consultations with marketing experts (i.e., marketing faculty at a southeastern university) 
helped to consolidate like-practices and eliminate duplicates for a unique set of price-setting 
practices, and to ensure that the descriptions correctly represented the price-setting practices 
identified from previous research. Each price-setting practice was revised to have similar 
wording (e.g., “sellers” and “buyers”) and tone so as to keep wording structure uniform among 
the price-setting practices and to minimize framing effects. 
 Pretest for Study 1. The purpose of a pretest for Study 1 was to identify a final set of 
price-setting practices and contexts to be used for Study 1. The goal was a wide range of unique 
price-setting practices (i.e., that can be clearly differentiated), and a set of contexts (i.e., products 
and services) in which those price-setting practices may be more or less socially acceptable.  
From the initial list of price-setting practices compiled in Table 3 and additional price-
setting practices derived from consultations with marketing experts, a revised set of twenty-one 
price-setting practices was composed to be used for the pretest (see Appendix A). Using open-
ended questions, consumers were asked to record which price-setting practices are used for 
which products or services. 
Sixteen consumers participated in the pretest. Each consumer was asked to respond to a 
subset consisting of half the price-setting practices so as to reduce respondent fatigue. The 
resulting contexts suggested by the respondents were classified, and frequencies of context per 
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price-setting practice were calculated. The results of the pretest, consultation with marketing 
experts, and a list of additional criteria were used in selecting the ultimate list of price-setting 
practices and list of contexts (i.e., products/services). 
The purpose of the criteria was to select a diverse set of price-setting practices and 
contexts to observe whether diversity brings about different judgments of social acceptability. 
First, price-setting practices that appeared to be difficult to understand or practices that were 
difficult to name as a context were eliminated from the final list. For example, more than half of 
respondents could not name a product or service that used absorption pricing; therefore, it was 
eliminated. If two price-setting practices appeared to be opposites, one was eliminated. For 
example, no-haggle pricing (i.e., pricing with no negotiating) and price discovery (i.e., pricing 
with negotiating) are opposites; therefore, no-haggle pricing was eliminated. Practices that 
seemed related to each other or resulted in similar contexts were either combined to create one 
modified practice, or the other similar practice was eliminated. Price discrimination (i.e., pricing 
based on demographic information) and credit risk pricing (i.e., pricing based on personal credit 
information) were combined to create a practice of price discrimination based on demographic or 
personal credit information.  
Frequencies revealed both practices that are unique to a limited set of contexts, as well as 
practices that are common to many contexts. Both extremes (i.e., limited contexts and many 
contexts) were included in the final list. Also, price-setting practices representing different 
context venues were included because consumers may evaluate pricing differently for various 
venues (e.g., Internet versus bricks-and-mortar; Hardesty and Suter 2005). Consumers may 
evaluate price-setting practices differently for those typically perceived to price services as those 
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typically perceived to price products because of the intangibility of service offerings (Shostack 
1977). Thus, price-setting practices for both products and services were included.  
The final list of twelve price-setting practices are (1) price skimming, (2) penetration 
pricing, (3) price bundling, (4) random discounting, (5) captive pricing, (6) volume discounting, 
(7) price discrimination, (8) price matching, (9) cost plus, (10) price discovery, (11) demand 
pricing, and (12) inside-information supply pricing. The final set, including descriptions, is 
provided in Appendix B. 
Attention to context type was important to achieve a diverse ultimate set of products and 
services. To begin, the products and services respondents suggested in the pretest were classified 
into groups such as electronics, apparel, insurance, cellular, travel, commodities, and 
entertainment. The frequencies of the classification of products and services per price-setting 
practice were then examined. Products and services that were frequently listed for multiple 
practices were highlighted. Electronic, computer, and automobile products were perceived to be 
priced by the greatest number of practices. For example, at least one person listed an electronic 
product for fourteen of the twenty-one price-setting practices. Therefore, a product characterized 
as electronic was included in the contexts (i.e., high definition television [HDTV]). There were 
also high frequencies of telecommunication and cellular products/services for a select number of 
practices, compared with other offering contexts. For example, telecommunication/cellular had 
the highest frequencies for both price bundling and volume discounting. Thus, cellular phones 
and services were included in the final set. On the other hand, contexts that had low frequencies 
or were not perceived to be priced by many practices were also highlighted. At least one person 
listed insurance for only three of the twenty-one practices. Therefore, insurance, specifically 
automobile insurance, was included. 
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Products and/or services that are at various price-points were included because prior 
research has indicated that fairness judgments about price may vary by high- (e.g., HDTV) and 
low-price points (e.g., bananas) (Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). Fairness judgments about 
pricing may also vary by necessity of product or service (Martins 1993); therefore, both luxury 
products/services (e.g., concert tickets) and necessity products/services (e.g., bananas) were 
included in the final set. Fairness judgments may vary on the durability of the offering. Athletic 
shoes were included in the final set of contexts because they are durable offerings, whereas 
concert tickets are transitory offerings.  
A follow-up survey on context selection asked fifty-six study participants to rate the final 
set of six contexts on price (i.e., 1 = low price and 7 = high price), need (i.e., 1 = necessity and 7 
= luxury), durability (1 = not at all durable and 7 = very durable), retail location purchase (i.e., 1 
= online, 4 = both, and 7 = bricks and mortar), and type of offering (i.e., 1 = strictly product, 4 = 
aspects of both products and services, and 7 = strictly service). The context selection survey is 
found in Appendix C.  The results of the survey found in Table 4 confirmed variation in the 
contexts, and the final set of six contexts were selected: (1) athletic shoes, (2) auto insurance, (3) 
bananas, (4) cell phone and service, (5) concert tickets, and (6) HDTV. 
Study 1. In a survey, each price-setting practice was described and respondents were 
asked to provide ratings of (1) perceptions of overall procedural fairness of the price-setting 
practice, (2) perceptions of pervasiveness or commonness of the price-setting practice within a 
given context, and (3) perceptions of social acceptability of the price-setting practice within a 
given context. Dickson and Kalapurakal’s (1994) single-item measures for overall fairness of the 
price-setting practice (i.e., “how would you rate the fairness of this behavior?”) and perceived 
frequency of occurrence of the price-setting practice (i.e., “in your experience, how frequently 
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does this behavior occur?”) were modified for the measures of overall fairness, pervasiveness, 
and social acceptability of the price-setting practices (p. 445). Other price fairness studies have 
used seven-point scales to capture fairness ratings; therefore, each of the three measures was on a 
seven-point scale (e.g., 1 = extremely unfair, 7 = extremely fair; 1 = extremely uncommon, 7 = 
extremely common; 1 = extremely unacceptable, 7 = extremely acceptable) (Dickson and 
Kalapurakal 1994; Campbell 1999a, b).  
The questionnaire first included questions about the perceptions of procedural fairness of 
the price-setting practices. Asking these questions first prevented respondents from being 
influenced by the specific-context evaluations of social acceptability and pervasiveness. 
Following the procedural fairness, social acceptability, and pervasiveness ratings were questions 
to capture three covariates: consumer knowledge about price-setting practices, the extent to 
which consumers think—including the extent to which consumers think about how sellers set 
prices, and familiarity with each of the six contexts.  
To measure consumer knowledge about price-setting practices, a modification of 
Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson’s (2007) pricing tactic persuasion knowledge (PTPK) scale was 
used. (For the modified subset of pricing tactic persuasion knowledge items, see Table 5). The 
mean index score for PTPK subset was 4.59 out of a possible 7.0. Pricing knowledge was not 
found to affect social acceptability of a price-setting practice (p > .05). To measure consumer 
thinking about price-setting practices, Wood and Swait’s (2002) need for cognition scale was 
adapted (Cronbach’s alpha = .819). Additionally, one question asked how much the consumer 
likes to think about how prices are set. Neither the need for cognition scale nor the single 
question about pricing thinking significantly affected social acceptability (both p > .05). Finally, 
consumers were asked to rate their familiarity with each of the six contexts on a scale of 1 to 5 
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where 1 is very unfamiliar and 5 is very familiar. Again, none of the familiarities with contexts 
was found to significantly influence social acceptability (all p > .05).  Appendix D presents the 
survey used in Study 1. 
 
Results 
 
Survey Instrument. The survey was administered in an online format to an online panel. 
The online format allowed easy navigation for panelists who likely have experience with other 
online surveys. The online survey also allowed requests for evaluations of one price-setting 
practice at a specific time. For example, one price-setting practice was described on the screen 
along with its measures of procedural fairness, social acceptability, and pervasiveness. Having 
one price-setting practice displayed on the screen at a time was to help the respondent focus on 
the price-setting practice at hand, without direct comparison with other practices. The order of 
the price-setting practices was randomized to reduce the effects of order bias. (The complete 
survey is presented in Appendix D.) 
Using twelve price-setting practices and six contexts required seventy-two (i.e., 12*6) 
stimulus evaluations. To prevent respondent fatigue, each respondent first evaluated all twelve 
price-setting practices on procedural fairness. The twelve practices were randomly presented to 
each respondent. Then, each respondent evaluated a subset of two of the twelve price-setting 
practices on all six contexts. The subset of two practices was randomly assigned and randomly 
ordered for each respondent.   
Sample. A total of 472 respondents participated in the study, eliciting 944 (i.e., 472*2) 
price-setting practice evaluations. The online panel offered greater geographic and demographic 
reach than a student sample, and was more generalizable to the adult consumer population as a 
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whole. Of those who participated, 85% reported that they did half or more of the household 
shopping; 70% were female, and 86% were white/Caucasian. Of the respondents, 54% were 
between the ages of 35 and 54. Household incomes showed a wide range: 16% of respondents 
reported making between $25,000 and $34,999, 19% making between $35,000 and $49,999, and 
13% making between $75,000 and $99,999. Geographic dispersion was wide: 28% were from 
the Midwest, 22% from the Southeast, and 19% from the Southwest.  
Except for income, no statistical demographic or geographic differences existed between 
people answering questions regarding different practices. The median income (i.e., $50,000 to 
$74,999) for random discounting and inside information supply pricing was higher than the 
median income (i.e., $35,000 to $49,999) for people who rated the other ten practices. However, 
income showed no effect on social acceptability of a price-setting practice (i.e., p >.05).  
Validity and Consistency. Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) suggested that single-item 
measures can be as valid as multiple-item measures, especially if there is content validity (i.e., as 
decided by expert judges) and predictive validity, where the measure gets as close as possible to 
matching the true correlation between the predictor measure and the criterion. The single-item 
measures of pervasiveness, fairness, and social acceptability were chosen because of similarity to 
a previous study of pricing fairness and commonness. To assess consistency in prediction of the 
single-item measures, the correlations for perceived pervasiveness and procedural fairness with 
social acceptability were compared across the six contexts. The correlations for perceived 
pervasiveness–social acceptability were consistent (i.e., range = .156-.250), with the exception 
that the bananas’ correlation was slightly higher (i.e., .342). The correlations for procedural 
fairness–social acceptability were consistent (i.e., range = .537-.640). The correlations for these 
measures can be found in Table 6. 
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The analysis for Study 1 was designed to test the moderating effect of perceived 
pervasiveness on the procedural fairness–social acceptability relationship (Hypothesis 1). Six 
analyses were necessary to test the hypothesis for each of the six contexts (i.e., bananas, HDTVs, 
etc.). The survey design exposed the analysis to dependency issues because each respondent 
rated two of the twelve price-setting practices, creating a cluster for each respondent. Ratings for 
Practice A by a respondent could be influenced by ratings for Practice B. Therefore, a simple 
regression could not be performed.  
First, to assess the amount of variance in social acceptability because of the differences 
within clusters (i.e., individual respondents), an intraclass correlation (ICC) was calculated for 
each context using a multilevel analysis with MPlus 5.1 software (Cohen, Cohen, West, and 
Aiken 2003). The ICC is the degree of nonindependence among a set of observations. If the 
nonindependence is ignored, alpha inflation, or the overestimating of significance, can occur 
(Cohen et al. 2003). Five of the six contexts of the ICCs were larger than the Cohen et al.’s 
(2003) suggested cutoff of .05 (i.e., range = .074 - .134), while the ICC for cell phone and 
service was acceptable at .038. The ICCs by context are presented in the left column in Table 7.  
Testing the Moderating Effect of Pervasiveness. The elevated ICCs indicated dependency 
within the clusters (i.e., respondents) that could not be ignored in testing Hypothesis 1. MPlus 
was used to test Hypothesis 1 because MPlus offers a complex regression analysis that takes into 
account clustering effects. In complex analysis, standard errors are adjusted so that alpha 
inflation did not occur.  
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) example of testing for effects of moderation, the 
main effect terms of both procedural fairness and pervasiveness on social acceptability, as well 
as the interactive effect term (i.e., multiplication of procedural fairness by pervasiveness), was 
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included in six regression equations (i.e., one for each context), where the dependent variable 
was social acceptability by context. The predictors were mean-centered to reduce collinearity 
between the main effects and the product interaction terms (Cohen et al. 2003). The six 
regression equations tested included (i.e., SA = social acceptability): 
    Bananas SA = β0 + β1 Fairness + β2Pervasiveness + β3Fairness*Pervasiveness + e 
    HDTV SA = β0 + β1 Fairness + β2Pervasiveness + β3Fairness*Pervasiveness + e 
    Athletic Shoes SA = β0 + β1 Fairness + β2Pervasiveness + β3Fairness*Pervasiveness + e 
    Concert Tickets SA = β0 + β1 Fairness + β2Pervasiveness + β3Fairness*Pervasiveness + e 
    Auto Insurance SA = β0 + β1 Fairness + β2Pervasiveness + β3Fairness*Pervasiveness + e 
    Cell Phone & Service SA = β0 + β1 Fairness + β2Pervasiveness + β3Fairness*Pervasiveness + e 
 
The results of the complex regression analysis can be found in Table 7. All six equation 
results indicated a significant positive main effect of procedural fairness on social acceptability 
(β1 range = .567 - .640, p < .01) and a significant positive main effect of pervasiveness on social 
acceptability (β2 range = .159 - .278, p <.01). The R2 ranged from .333 - .445. Four of the six 
regression results (i.e., bananas, HDTV, athletic shoes, and cell phone and service) provided 
some evidence for supporting Hypothesis 1, because the interaction terms were significant (i.e., 
β3 range = .025 - .051, p <.05). However, the regression results for concert tickets and auto 
insurance indicated no support for Hypothesis 1 because of nonsignificant interaction terms (i.e., 
β3 range = .006 - .021, p >.05).  
Although four of the regression equations indicated a significant interaction between 
procedural fairness and pervasiveness, the hypothesis was not fully supported unless the 
evidence showed:  
a) When procedural fairness is low, pervasiveness has a direct positive effect on social 
acceptability, and b) When procedural fairness is high, pervasiveness has no effect on 
social acceptability.  
 
To look for further evidence, social acceptability, procedural fairness, and pervasiveness were 
plotted in six charts, one for each context. Charts 1–6 display each of these measures by price-
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setting practice. Looking at the trend of the charts, it appears that when procedural fairness was 
low, high pervasiveness had no effect on social acceptability, and social acceptability was 
highest when both procedural fairness and pervasiveness were high. Therefore, the significant 
interactions were evidence that pervasiveness moderated the procedural fairness–social 
acceptability relationship, but perhaps not as hypothesized.  
Simple slopes of the six regression equations were calculated at high, mean, and low 
values of pervasiveness. The simple slopes are presented in Table 8. The simple slopes provided 
evidence that high pervasiveness strengthened the positive relationship between fairness and 
social acceptability for the bananas, HDTV, athletic shoes, and cell phone and service contexts.  
What are the Rules of Fair Pricing? The results of Study 1 provided consumer ratings of 
twelve different price-setting practices used in the marketplace today. Table 9 presents perceived 
pervasiveness by context and procedural fairness ratings for the twelve price-setting practices. 
The most procedurally unfair practice was price discrimination (i.e., mean = 1.90), and the most 
procedurally fair practice was price matching (mean = 5.60).  
Table 10 presents the lists of socially acceptable and socially unacceptable price-setting 
practices. Practices were classified as socially acceptable if the practice means were statistically 
greater than the midpoint (i.e., >4.00, p <.05) and unacceptable if less than the midpoint (i.e., 
<4.00, p <.05). Social acceptability of the twelve price-setting practices was context specific, 
with price matching being the only socially acceptable practice and discriminatory pricing, 
random discounting, inside information supply pricing, and demand pricing being the only 
socially unacceptable practices across all six contexts. There were more socially unacceptable 
practices (i.e., range = 4 – 8) than acceptable practices (i.e., range = 1 – 3). 
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Not only is the final list of price-setting practices by degree of social acceptability 
informative for insight into how consumers view price-setting practices in the marketplace, but 
the final list was used to select procedurally fair and unfair practices that were used to 
manipulate breaking the social norm in Study 2.  
 
Study 2: Effects of Breaking a Socially Acceptable Pricing Rule on PPF 
 
Method 
 
This study included testing the effects of following/deviating from an acceptable pricing 
rule (i.e., price-setting practice) and perceptions of price fairness (PPF), demonstrating the 
differential effects on cognitive and affective components of PPF, and testing hypothesized 
differences in response behaviors based on the cognitive and affective dimensions of PPF.  
 The Experiment. The results of Study 1 provided practices that were seen as procedurally 
fair/unfair and practices that were perceived as pervasive/not pervasive within context, and 
ultimately, practices that were seen as more and less socially acceptable. Thus, the study 
identified the combinations of both procedural fairness and pervasiveness that determine social 
acceptability of a practice, and provided the ability to manipulate practices to test the 
hypothesized effects of violated social norms for price-setting practices in a 2x2 experiment.  
To minimize confounds for the experiment, several criteria were considered in selecting 
the manipulations. First, two price-setting practices were required to manipulate fairness. Ideally, 
the two practices would have a large difference in procedural fairness means. (Review Table 9 
for mean procedural fairness ratings and pervasiveness ratings by context from Study 1.) The 
two price-setting practice descriptions should also closely mirror each other. Random 
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discounting (i.e., mean = 2.50) and cost plus pricing (i.e., mean = 4.96) were chosen because 
they differ in procedural fairness perceptions by 2.46 scale points. Random discounting is 
defined as follows:  
The seller considers its costs, then sets different prices on a random basis. Any increases 
or decreases in price occur completely at random. People pay different prices depending 
on when they buy.  
  
Cost plus pricing is defined as follows:  
The seller sets the price to its customers based on its total costs plus a “mark-up” to 
achieve its profit. The reason for the increases or decreases in price is because costs to the 
seller have increased or decreased. People pay different prices depending on whether 
costs have gone up or down for the seller. 
 
Random discounting and cost plus pricing are closely mirrored because cost plus prices differ 
based on seller costs while random prices differ without being based on seller costs.  
Study 1 measured consumer’s perceptions of pervasiveness of a price-setting practice. 
However, for Study 2, allowing respondents to give their opinion of pervasiveness was not ideal 
because consumers may have different views of whether a practice is pervasive, and it is unlikely 
that they are all correct about the actual pervasiveness of a practice. Charts 7–18 present the 
distribution of the question: “How common is this price-setting practice used to price HDTVs?” 
by each of the twelve price-setting practices (on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = extremely 
uncommon and 7 = extremely common). For many of the practices, consumer perceptions of 
pervasiveness were spread out over the length of the seven-point scale. With the exception of 
price skimming, cost plus pricing, and demand pricing, consumers did not agree on the 
pervasiveness of a practice in pricing HDTVs. Therefore, pervasiveness of the price-setting 
practice was manipulated by telling the respondent the practice was either highly pervasive or 
not highly pervasive, instead of relying on respondent perceptions. 
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The final criteria to minimize confounds was to couch all the scenarios of the experiment 
within a single context. High definition television (HDTV) was selected as the single context for 
the experiment because the mean social acceptability rating for random discounting was low 
(i.e., mean = 2.80) and the mean rating for cost plus pricing was high (i.e., mean = 4.76).  
 In summary, the 2x2 experiment consisted of a high procedural fairness practice, cost 
plus pricing, and a low procedural fairness practice, random discounting. For each practice, 
pervasiveness was manipulated by telling the respondent that the practice is very commonly used 
to price electronics or that the practice is not commonly used to price electronics. (See Appendix 
E for all manipulations.) These four combinations were set in scenarios in which each asked the 
respondent to imagine a situation in which they were shopping for an HDTV. A photo of an 
HDTV and a price (e.g., $1,249.99) were displayed. The price was chosen from the median 
HDTV price range (i.e., $1,000–$1,499) for two large HDTV retailer chains. The photo and price 
remained constant over the four cells.   
After the respondents read one of the four scenarios, each completed a questionnaire 
containing manipulation checks for each of the treatments, measures of social acceptability of the 
price-setting practice described, cognitive and affective assessments of price fairness, outcome 
PPF (i.e., fair–unfair), intentions for response behaviors, covariate measures, and demographic 
information for descriptive purposes. Descriptions of these measures are presented in the next 
section. 
Manipulation Checks and Social Acceptability. The manipulation check for procedural 
fairness was similar to the measure from Study 1. The price-setting practice was described 
followed by a single fairness item (i.e., extremely unfair/extremely fair). The price-setting 
practice was further described within context (i.e., electronics) and the respondent was told 
 49
whether the practice is commonly used within that context. The manipulation check for 
pervasiveness (i.e., extremely uncommon/extremely common) and the single-item measure for 
social acceptability (i.e., extremely unacceptable/extremely acceptable) then followed the 
description.  
After two failed manipulation check pretests, a short example was added to each price-
setting practice. The manipulations were failing because respondents did not believe the 
manipulation that random discounting was a common way to price HDTVs. The example 
provided a tangible situation that helped make the manipulation of high pervasiveness 
successful, without jeopardizing the low pervasiveness scenario. The added examples can be 
found in Appendix E. The third manipulation check pretest was successful with low fairness n = 
31, mean = 3.00, high fairness n = 21, mean = 5.52, (i.e., t = 4.01, p <.01), and with low 
pervasiveness n = 22, mean = 2.45, high pervasiveness n = 30, mean = 5.77 (i.e., t = 6.84, p 
<.01). There were no interaction manipulation effects (i.e., fairness F = .930, p >.05, 
pervasiveness F = .366, p >.05). 
Multidimensionality of PPF. The multidimensionality of price fairness has not previously 
been evaluated. To develop the set of items for both cognitive assessment and affective 
assessment of price fairness, examples from dual mental processing research and previous 
pricing research were considered.  
In the dual mental processing study by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999), the authors 
manipulated the dominant use of affective and cognitive mental processing of consumer choice 
between chocolate cake and fruit salad. Without nutritional information, the choice of the 
chocolate cake was found to be driven by affective mental processing, but when nutritional 
information was provided, the choice of the fruit salad was driven by cognitive mental 
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processing. To measure affective processing, items that tapped the respondents’ emotional 
response were asked, such as “I could sense a desire to take it,” and “The emotional side of me 
was aroused when I saw it.” To measure cognitive processing, items were included that asked 
respondents to think about whether the dessert was “not good for health/good for health” and 
either “harmful/beneficial.” The cognitive items encouraged the respondent to think beyond the 
immediate emotional or personal satisfaction and think about more long-term or calculated 
consequences of the dessert. The essences of these measures of affective (e.g., emotional) and 
cognitive (e.g., calculative) processing were exemplified in selecting items for the affective and 
cognitive assessments of PPF.  
Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, and Ybema (2006) used a dual processing approach to 
examine evaluations of a price. In their study, the authors measured satisfaction with a price and 
fairness of a price in situations where the price was advantageous to the consumer, but the price 
was not equitable to prices other consumers had to pay. Satisfaction with the price was a 
personal, first-impression reaction to the price, described by the authors as “egoism-based 
preference” (2006, p. 274). On the other hand, fairness of the price was a deductive response to 
whether the price was equitable, fair, and just to all. The satisfaction measures contained some 
emotional items such as “very dissatisfied/very satisfied” and “very unhappy/very happy,” while 
the fairness measures were more cognitive, such as “very unjust/very just.”  
While the Van den Bos et al. (2006) study did not measure a multidimensionality of price 
fairness, parallels can be made from the affective assessment of PPF to their price satisfaction 
(e.g., emotions) and from the cognitive assessment of PPF to their price fairness (e.g., deductive 
assessment). Therefore, “satisfaction” with the price and “happiness” with the price were 
selected as measures of affective assessment of PPF, and “the price is justified” was selected as a 
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measure of cognitive assessment of PPF. Many of the remaining items for both the cognitive and 
affective measures of PPF were selected and modified from the pricing literature, including the 
price being rated as “questionable,” “a rip-off,” and “honest” from Darke and Dahl (2003) and 
used in Haws and Bearden (2006).  
Content Validity – Multidimensionality of PPF. In an item-selection survey,2 five 
cognitive assessments and five affective assessments of PPF were presented along with 
descriptions of the two dimensions of PPF to sixteen marketing experts (i.e., faculty and doctoral 
students at a southeastern university). The respondents were asked to confirm or disconfirm the 
categorization of the items as cognitive or affective assessments of PPF and to suggest other 
items that may have been appropriate. The items that less than 50% of respondents agreed on 
were eliminated and additional items were added. From this combined list, the final set of items 
was selected based on high agreement of classification and uniqueness to the other items in the 
set. The results of the multidimensionality of PPF item selection survey can be found in Table 
11. Factor analysis of the combined cognitive and affective assessments items in pretesting 
revealed two distinct dimensions of PPF (i.e., n = 52, Λ1 = 5.99, Λ2 = 1.32). 
In addition to measuring the affective and cognitive assessments, an outcome measure of 
PPF was also measured. This is the more frequently used single-item semantic differential 
measure (e.g., fair/unfair) (Urbany, Madden, and Dickson, 1989; Campbell 1999a, 1999b). 
Although the cognitive and affective assessments of PPF were conceptualized to lead to 
an outcome PPF, we did not interpret this to be a higher order model. Instead of requiring both 
cognitive assessments and affective assessments to be present for a higher order model, we 
predicted that either cognitive assessment or affective assessment would dominate impact on the 
                                                 
2 The affective/cognitive item selection survey can be found in Appendix F. 
 52
outcome measure of PPF (e.g., fair–unfair). Therefore, a higher order model to describe the 
multidimensionality of PPF would be inappropriate. 
Response Behaviors. Response behaviors were measured by inquiring how the consumer 
would respond behaviorally to the presented scenario. To measure the intended response 
behaviors, Bearden and Teel’s (1983) Guttman scale for measuring consumer complaining 
behavior was considered. Their scale included items ranging from low complaining intensity 
(“warned family and friends”) to high complaining intensity (“took some legal action”).  
Singh (1988) explored multidimensionality in consumer complaining behavior, which 
may include voicing responses (e.g., seek redress from seller), private responses (e.g., 
communicate problems by word-of-mouth), and third-party responses (e.g., take legal action). 
Exploratory analysis and confirmatory analysis confirmed the three distinct dimensions in his 
research. While his research was limited to complaining behavior and was in response to 
dissatisfaction, the current research response behaviors to price fairness were exemplified by his 
method of measuring each item separately as opposed to a single escalation scale. This way, 
factor analysis could also confirm dimensionality of response behaviors (i.e., revenge-seeking, 
self-protection, and no-action) that was first validated through content validity. 
First, items varying in intensity were modified from Bearden and Teel (1983) and Singh 
(1988), including “make negative comments to friends and family,” “send a complaint to 
company headquarters,” and “express your disapproval to the store manager.” Additional items 
were added that reflected updated response options available to consumers, such as posting 
negative online reviews.  
Positive response behavior, or “promotion” behavior, were also added to the three 
hypothesized negative response categories behaviors (i.e., see Hypotheses 4 and 5). Promotion 
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behavior included items such as, “express your approval to the store manager,” and “give 
positive recommendations to friends or family.” Positive ratings of practices and prices were 
anticipated, given that half of the scenarios featured a procedurally fair price-setting practice; 
therefore, the absence of positive response behavior may have confused respondents and may 
have led them to respond falsely to behavior intentions. While there were no hypotheses about 
promotion behavior, outcome PPF was expected to have a positive effect on promotion behavior 
intentions.  
Content Validity – Response Behaviors. A response behavior item selection survey3 was 
conducted to classify each of the proposed items as an indicator of one of the four response 
behaviors. Sixteen marketing experts (i.e., faculty and doctoral students) from a southeastern 
university were asked to indicate whether each item is a “revenge-seeking behavior,” “self-
protection behavior,” “no-action behavior,” or “promotion behavior.” The results of this survey 
are presented in Table 12. Items were classified by the highest majority of respondent agreement. 
An additional item (i.e., “how would this [scenario] affect your future shopping with this 
retailer?”) was added to the final survey as an additional item for no-action behavior. Factor 
analysis of the combined response behavior items in pretesting revealed four distinct dimensions 
of response behavior (i.e., n = 52, Λ1 = 4.372, Λ2 = 2.732, Λ3 = 1.539, and Λ4 = 1.226). 
Covariates. To measure objective consumer knowledge of price-setting practices, a 
modification of a subset of the PTPK scale for measuring pricing tactic persuasion knowledge 
was employed (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007). See Table 5 for the PTPK subset. The 
correct responses to each consumer’s knowledge scale were tallied to reveal an individual’s 
objective knowledge score (i.e., mean index score = 4.64 out of a possible 7). Respondents were 
asked to indicate their familiarity with HDTVs (i.e., the context for the scenarios) on a scale of 1 
                                                 
3 The response behavior item selection survey is found in Appendix F. 
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to 5, where 1 was very unfamiliar and 5 was very familiar (i.e., mean = 3.20). To measure 
consumer assertion and aggression, three items of each respective scale were modified from 
Richins (1983).  
 
Results 
 
Instrument. The data collection method for this study was an online survey presented to 
an online panel for greater geographic and demographic reach than a student sample, and more 
generalizability to the adult consumer population. The survey, including all four scenarios, is 
presented in Appendix G.  
Sample. Participating in the study were 267 respondents. Of those who participated, 92% 
reported doing half or more of the household shopping; 77% were female; 82% were 
white/Caucasian. Of the respondents, 72% were between the ages of 25 and 54. Household 
incomes ranged widely: 17% made $25,000 to $34,999; 20% made $35,000 to $49,999; 22% 
made $50,000 to $74,999. Respondents were also widely dispersed geographically: 27% were 
from the Southwest; 26% were from the Midwest; and 21% were from the Southeast. 
The experimental cells contained 64, 66, 68, and 69 respondents. No statistical 
differences existed between respondents in different cells except for ethnicity: For the high 
procedural fairness x low pervasiveness condition, white/Caucasians showed a higher frequency 
(i.e., 86%). The other three cells had no such differences. However, ethnicity showed no effect 
regarding social acceptability of a price-setting practice, nor did ethnicity affect outcome PPF 
(i.e., both p >.05). 
Manipulation Checks. The manipulations were successful with low fairness n = 134, 
mean = 3.00, and high fairness n = 133, mean = 5.02, (i.e., t = 10.42, p <.01), and with low 
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pervasiveness n = 137, mean = 2.68, and high pervasiveness n = 130, mean = 6.11 (i.e., t = 
16.79, p <.01). No interaction manipulation effects were seen (i.e., fairness F = 1.166, p >.05, 
pervasiveness F = 1.904, p >.05). 
Validity and Reliabilities of Measures. The items for the two proposed dimension of price 
fairness were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis. First, the negative scaled items were 
reverse coded. The results of the varimax-rotated factor analysis (i.e., found in Table 13) 
revealed two distinct dimensions of PPF, but the items did not behave as the item selection 
survey. The items with passive wording loaded on the same factor, indicating cognitive 
assessment (i.e., slow response, calculated), and the strongest negative wording loaded on the 
same factor, indicating affective assessment (i.e., fast response, emotional). Not used were the 
items that were inconsistent with content validity for cognitive (e.g., happy with price, satisfied 
with price, feels right, and pleasantly surprised) or for affective (e.g., value may not be worth 
price). The final items (i.e., Cronbach alpha = .818) used in the analysis for cognitive PPF were 
(1) price is justified, (2) price I would expect to pay, and (3) people would find this to be a 
reasonable price, and the final items (i.e., Cronbach alpha = .827) for affective PPF were (1) 
price is a rip-off, (2) price is dishonest, and (3) price is questionable. 
The items for the four response behaviors were also subjected to an exploratory factor 
analysis. First the opposite scaled items were reverse coded. Table 14 presents the results of the 
varimax-rotated factor analysis. Unlike the pretest of these measures, which suggested the four 
anticipated response behavior dimensions, the revenge-seeking and self-protection items loaded 
on the same factor. However, the promotion items and two of the three no-action items loaded on 
their respective separate factors. The four promotion items (Cronbach alpha = .847) included in 
the analysis were (1) express approval to manager, (2) express approval to other customers, (3) 
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spread positive WOM, and (4) post positive online reviews. The two no-action items (Cronbach 
alpha = .653) included in the analysis were (1) no effect on future behavior and (2) shop about 
the same in the future. 
The revenge-seeking and self-protection items were examined more closely. Using 
content validity achieved from the item selection survey, reliabilities, and inter-item correlations 
were analyzed for five revenge-seeking items and for two self-protection items. The revenge-
seeking inter-item correlation for “take legal action” was mostly low (e.g., .218, .362, .439, and 
.619); therefore, it was removed. The four remaining revenge-seeking items (Cronbach alpha = 
.828) used in the analysis were (1) express disapproval to other customers, (2) spread negative 
WOM, (3) post negative online reviews, and (4) complain to the Better Business Bureau. The 
two self-protection items (Cronbach alpha = .803) used in the analysis were (1) express 
disapproval to the manager and (2) complain to headquarters. Confirmatory factor analysis 
would further assess discrimination between revenge-seeking and self-protection constructs. 
To assess convergent and discriminant validity, a confirmatory factor analysis using 
MPlus was conducted that included all the measures of the model. The diagonal of the phi matrix 
was set to 1.0. The resulting model showed acceptable fit with χ2 = 103.66, df = 63, p<.01, CFI = 
.977 (i.e., within Hu and Bentler’s 1999 recommended cutoff of >.95), SRMR = .049 (i.e., within 
the recommended cutoff of <.08), and RMSEA = .034 (i.e., within the recommended cutoff of 
<.06). Each of the indicator’s estimated pattern coefficient on its respective construct factor was 
significant (i.e., p <.01) confirming convergent validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). To assess 
discriminant validity, each pair of constructs was examined by constraining the estimated 
correlation parameter to 1 and comparing the χ2 for the constrained and unconstrained models 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Discriminant validity was confirmed for all of the model factors, 
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including the revenge-seeking construct and self-protection construct, because the χ2s for each of 
the constrained models were significantly higher than the unconstrained models (i.e., all p <.05, 
range χ2difference = 5.74 – 225.67, dfdifference = 1). 
Analysis of the Model. The first objective of Study 2 was to assess the moderating effect 
of pervasiveness on the procedural fairness–social acceptability relationship (i.e., Hypothesis 1). 
First, individual responses in the data set were evaluated to ensure proper manipulation by the 
respondent. Those who were not at all manipulated were removed for testing Hypothesis 1. The 
criteria for being manipulated was to rate a fair price-setting practice as 3–7 or an unfair practice 
as 1–5 on the procedural fairness scale (i.e., where 1 = extremely unfair and 7 = extremely fair) 
and to rate a high pervasive practice as 3–7 or a low pervasive practice as 1–5 on the 
pervasiveness scale (i.e., where 1 = extremely uncommon and 7 = extremely common). For 
example, respondents in Cell 1 (i.e., high procedural fairness x high pervasiveness) who rated 
procedural fairness as extremely unfair (i.e., 1 or 2 on scale) or rated pervasiveness as extremely 
uncommon (i.e., 1 or 2 on scale) were not properly manipulated; therefore, they were removed 
for this analysis. In all, 33 respondents were removed, leaving 56, 58, 60 and 60 respondents per 
experimental cell.  
Hypothesis 1. To test the hypothesis, regression analysis was performed using SPSS 15.0. 
Regression analysis was used over ANOVA because beta values were necessary to answer our 
hypothesized question. Contrast-coded dummy variables (i.e., -.5, +.5) were used to represent the 
procedural fairness manipulation and the pervasiveness manipulation. The contrast coding is 
useful in testing interactions with nominal variables because they are orthogonal and allow easier 
interpretation of the betas (Cohen et al. 2003).  
 58
The results of the regression analysis initially suggested support for Hypothesis 1. Both 
procedural fairness and pervasiveness had direct positive effects on social acceptability (i.e., β1 = 
.452, p <.01, β2 = .215, p <.01). The interaction term (i.e., procedural fairness * pervasiveness) 
also had a significant positive effect on social acceptability (i.e., R2 = .279, β3 = .152, p <.01). 
The beta value for the interaction term was positive, suggesting that high pervasiveness 
strengthens the positive procedural fairness–social acceptability relationship, but did not reveal 
that when procedural fairness is low, high pervasiveness will bring about higher social 
acceptability. When the social acceptability scores were graphed for low/high procedural fairness 
and low/high pervasiveness (see Figure 5), little effect was seen of pervasiveness on social 
acceptability when procedural fairness was low. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not fully 
supported. However, social acceptability was highest when there was both high procedural 
fairness and high pervasiveness. 
Hypothesis 2. To test Hypothesis 2, (i.e., the effect of using a socially acceptable practice 
on outcome PPF) and Hypothesis 3 (i.e., effect of using a socially unacceptable practice on the 
multidimensionality PPF), it was first necessary to establish the decision rule for what makes a 
practice socially acceptable. In Study 1, random discounting was found to be an unacceptable 
practice to price HDTVs (i.e., mean = 2.80) and cost plus pricing was found to be an acceptable 
practice to price HDTVs (i.e., mean = 4.76). However, Study 1 was based on perceived 
pervasiveness, while pervasiveness was manipulated for Study 2. The results from testing 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that social acceptability was determined by both fairness and 
pervasiveness, so it would be incorrect to simply name random as the unacceptable practice and 
cost plus as the acceptable practice in this experiment. Also, data would be lost if only the fair x 
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high pervasive cell was named the only socially acceptable practice, because some respondents 
in the other three cells rated their corresponding practice as acceptable.  
The measure of social acceptability was then examined. A series of multigroup structural 
equation analyses at varying cutoff levels of social acceptability were conducted. The analyses 
were designed to look for clear jump-off in cognitive, affective, and outcome PPF parameter 
values. The most dramatic change in parameter values occurred when a socially unacceptable 
practice was rated 1–3 (i.e., n = 111), and when a socially acceptable practice was rated 4–7 (i.e., 
n = 156). Therefore, this became the decision rule as to which practices would be considered 
socially acceptable and socially unacceptable for the purpose of testing Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
The dummy variable for social acceptability was transformed to contrast coding (i.e., -.5, 
+.5) to assess Hypothesis 2. The covariates pricing knowledge and familiarity with context were 
included with social acceptability as independent variables in a regression equation. Results of 
the regression analysis can be found in Table 15. The results showed support for Hypothesis 2; 
the use of a socially unacceptable price-setting practice brought greater perceptions of price 
unfairness than use of a socially acceptable practice (i.e., partial R2 = .085, F change = 14.143, β 
= .295, p <.01).  
Consumer Knowledge and Consumer Familiarity as Covariates. Although consumer 
familiarity with the context (i.e., HDTV) was nonsignificant in affecting outcome PPF (i.e., p 
>.05), consumer knowledge had a significant partial relationship with outcome PPF (i.e., partial 
R2 = .038, F change = 5.708, β = -.207, p <.01). The greater objective pricing knowledge a 
consumer had, the more unfair they perceived outcome prices. 
Hypothesis 3. Similar to the analysis used by MacKenzie and Spreng (1992), a multiple 
group structural equation model was used to detect differences in strength of relationship to 
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confirm or disconfirm effect of breaking the rules on PPF (i.e., using a socially acceptable price 
setting practice versus using a socially unacceptable price-setting practice). MacKenzie and 
Spreng (1992) used multigroup structural equation modeling to detect difference in central and 
peripheral mental processing by comparing the strength of relationships between kind of mental 
processing and attitudes. In a similar way, multigroup structural equation modeling with MPlus 
was used to confirm evidence of the multidimensionality of PPF. Figure 6 presents the two group 
model tested in this analysis. MPlus automatically specified the multigroup model by fixing one 
factor loading from each construct to 1, and construct intercepts were constrained to be equal 
across groups (Muthén and Muthén 2007).  
The model demonstrated good fit within Hu and Benter’s (1999) suggested cut-offs (i.e., 
χ2 = 30.234, df = 32, p=.55, CFI = 1.0, SRMR = .043). Compared with a null model where factor 
variances and means were set to equal, the unconstrained model’s χ2 was significantly lower 
(χ2difference = 161.82, dfdifference = 9, p<.05).  
Table 16 reports the results of the analysis to assess the multidimensionality of PPF. In 
both groups, significant positive effects were seen of cognitive assessment and affective 
assessment on outcome PPF (i.e., both p <.01). To test for change in strength of relationship 
(paths between cognitive and outcome PPF and between affective and outcome PPF), the model 
was re-estimated, this time constraining the beta estimates to be equal across groups. The 
significant change in χ2 indicated differences in parameter strengths across the groups (χ2difference 
= 13.0, dfdifference = 3, p<.05). This confirmed that use of a socially unacceptable price-setting 
practice (i.e., “breaking the rules”) brought differences in cognitive and affective impact on 
outcome PPF. This finding suggested partial support for Hypothesis 3, but the changes in impact 
had to be evaluated first to fully support the hypothesis.  
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In the high social acceptability group, the cognitive PPF beta (i.e., β3,1) was .615 and the 
affective PPF beta (i.e., β3,2) was .473. Hypothesis 3 claimed that when a socially unacceptable 
practice is used, the impact of cognitive PPF on outcome PPF (i.e., β3,1) should be reduced and 
the impact of affective PPF on outcome PPF (i.e., β3,2) should be inflated. However, these results 
showed the opposite effect. In the low social acceptability group, the cognitive PPF beta was 
inflated to .840, while the affective PPF beta was reduced to .282. The impact of cognitive PPF 
was actually greater when a socially unacceptable practice was used. These results did not fully 
support Hypothesis 3; use of a socially unacceptable practice brought about differences in 
cognitive/affective PPF affects on outcome PPF, but the impact of cognitive PPF—not affective 
PPF as hypothesized—was greater when a socially unacceptable practice was used. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5. Negative affective PPF was hypothesized to bring about more 
intentions for self-protection and revenge-seeking behaviors, and less intentions for no-action 
behavior (i.e., Hypothesis 4), and negative cognitive PPF was hypothesized to bring about more 
intentions for self-protection and no-action behaviors, and less intentions for revenge-seeking 
behavior (i.e., Hypothesis 5). Regression analyses were performed for each of the four response 
behaviors (i.e., no-action, self-protection, revenge-seeking, and promotion behaviors) for both 
affective PPF and cognitive PPF. Included in the regression models were the covariates, 
assertiveness and aggressiveness.   
Results of the regression analyses to confirm or disconfirm Hypotheses 4 and 5 can be 
found in Table 17. Hypothesis 4 was partially supported. As hypothesized, a negative direct 
effect of affective PPF was seen on self-protection (i.e., β = -.331, p <.01) and revenge-seeking 
(i.e., β = -.404, p <.01) behaviors, but, unlike the hypothesis, a direct negative effect of affective 
PPF was also seen on no-action behavior (i.e., β = -.152, p <.01). Similarly, Hypothesis 5 was 
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partially supported. A negative direct effect of cognitive PPF was seen on self-protection (i.e., β 
= -.333, p <.01) and no-action behavior (i.e., β = -.190, p <.01), but, unlike the hypothesis, a 
direct negative effect of cognitive PPF was also seen on revenge-seeking behavior (i.e., β = -
.346, p <.01). While not hypothesized, both affective PPF and cognitive PPF had significant 
positive effects on promotion behavior (i.e., β = .372, p <.01, and β = .546, p <.01, respectively).  
 Assertiveness and Aggressiveness as Covariates. Assertiveness had a significant partial 
relationship with no-action, self-protection, and revenge-seeking behaviors in both affective PPF 
and cognitive PPF models. As assertiveness increased, intentions for self-protection and revenge-
seeking behaviors increased and intentions for no-action behavior decreased. On the other hand, 
aggressiveness had only a significant partial relationship with self-protection and revenge-
seeking behaviors in the affective PPF and cognitive PPF models. As aggressiveness increased, 
intentions for self-protection and revenge-seeking behaviors increased. Results for both 
assertiveness and aggressiveness can be found in Table 17. 
Summary 
 
Study 1 examined consumer ratings of social acceptability, procedural fairness, and 
perceived pervasiveness for twelve price-setting practices across six contexts. The ratings of 
practices were used to preliminarily examine the first hypothesis, the moderating effect of 
pervasiveness on the procedural fairness–social acceptability relationship. Results of the 
complex regression analysis provided partial support for Hypothesis 1. Four contexts (i.e., 
bananas, HDTV, athletic shoes, and cell phone and service) resulted in positive interaction terms, 
but further examination of acceptability charts by practice suggested that the moderating effect 
of pervasiveness may only strengthen the positive impact of procedurally fairness on social 
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acceptability and not increase social acceptability ratings when procedural fairness is low as 
hypothesized.  
Study 2 provided an experimental test of Hypothesis 1 to further confirm or disconfirm 
the moderating role of pervasiveness. Regression results revealed significant interaction between 
pervasiveness and procedural fairness, but the graphical representation of fairness x 
pervasiveness social acceptability ratings confirmed the findings of Study 1 that high 
pervasiveness does not increase social acceptability when procedural fairness is low. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. 
Another regression analysis confirmed Hypothesis 2; using a socially unacceptable price-
setting practice brings greater perceptions of price unfairness. Evidence was shown of the 
multidimensionality of PPF as established with a multigroup structural equation analysis; 
however, Hypothesis 3 was not fully supported. The impact of affective PPF on outcome PPF 
was less and the impact of cognitive PPF on outcome PPF was greater when a socially 
unacceptable practice was used. This finding countered what was posited in Hypothesis 3. 
Finally, the response–behavior hypotheses were tested with a series of regression 
analyses. Hypotheses 4 and 5 were only partially supported. Hypothesis 4 posited greater 
intentions for revenge-seeking and self-protection behavior, which was supported in the results, 
and less intention for no-action behavior, which was not supported when high negative affective 
PPF was present. Hypothesis 5 posited greater intentions for self-protection and no-action 
behavior, which was supported in the results, and less intention for revenge-seeking behavior, 
which was not supported, when there was high negative cognitive PPF.  
In the next chapter, implications for Study 1 and Study 2 results are discussed. Also in 
Chapter 4, limitations are addressed and future research directions are suggested. 
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Chapter 4: Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
 
In Chapter 3, the methods and results of two studies were described, examining effects of 
procedural fairness and pervasiveness on social acceptability and the effects of using socially 
unacceptable price-setting practices on perceptions of price fairness. In this chapter the 
theoretical and managerial implications from the findings in those two studies are presented. 
Limitations for both studies of this research are examined. Finally, these studies suggested more 
research questions, which are presented in the future research section of this chapter. 
 
Theoretical Implications  
  
The Role of Pervasiveness. Hypothesis 1 examined the moderating role of pervasiveness 
in determining social acceptability of a price-setting practice. Although procedural fairness is the 
main driver of social acceptability, the combination of high procedural fairness and high 
pervasiveness was found to bring about the highest ratings of social acceptability. On the other 
hand, the hypothesized increase in social acceptability because of high pervasiveness, even when 
procedural fairness was low, did not materialize. For example, discriminatory pricing, a low 
procedural fairness practice, is very common in many contexts, including events requiring 
admission such as amusement parks and movies (e.g., seniors and students get discounts). Even 
when perceived pervasiveness of discrimination pricing is high, as with automobile insurance 
(i.e., mean = 5.66), the practice is still seen as socially unacceptable. Another example of high 
pervasiveness is seller’s use of inside information supply pricing for concert tickets. Respondents 
rated this practice for concert tickets as the highest pervasive practice out of all the practices–
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contexts (i.e., mean = 5.73). However, inside information supply pricing was rated as 
unacceptable for sellers to use to set prices for concert tickets. Pervasiveness alone cannot bring 
social acceptability to a procedurally unfair practice.  
The greatest opportunity for high social acceptability of a practice occurs when both the 
practice is perceived to be fair and common for a given context. For example, cost plus pricing 
and penetration pricing, both procedurally fair practices, were also perceived to be commonly 
used to price bananas (i.e., mean = 5.20) and cell phones with service (i.e., mean = 4.76), 
respectively. The combination of the two variables brought high ratings of social acceptability 
for those two practices (i.e., mean = 4.82 and mean = 4.65, respectively). 
Differences in Contexts. The purpose of Study 1 was to explore social acceptability over 
a wide range of practices and contexts as exemplified by Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal’s (2003) 
research examining price fairness perceptions across two product categories (i.e., lettuce and 
refrigerators). Although examining effects of pervasiveness and fairness over a wide range of 
price-setting practices gave partial support of Hypothesis 1 across practices, examining 
Hypothesis 1 over six different contexts provided evidence that effects of pervasiveness and 
fairness on social acceptability may be context-specific only. The analyses of the six contexts 
revealed significant moderating effects of pervasiveness for four contexts. The other two 
contexts, automobile insurance and concert tickets, did not have significant moderating 
pervasiveness effects.  
Substantial differences were seen between these two contexts and the other four that may 
suggest differences in how consumers view the acceptability of price-setting practices. First, 
these contexts are services, whereas the others have at least partial aspects of products. (The cell 
phone with service context may have been viewed mostly as a product.) There may be different 
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rules for social acceptability of practices used to price services than to price products. In fact, 
Bolton and Alba (2006) found that consumers perceive price fairness differently for goods and 
services in certain circumstances (e.g., when salient vendor costs are nonalignable). 
Multiple levels exist within each service offering (i.e., automobile insurance and concert 
tickets), and each may be subject to a different price-setting practice. For example, consumers 
can buy more or less auto insurance coverage based on number of cars or number of drivers. 
Then they can choose supplemental insurance such as life insurance or home insurance and 
perhaps qualify for a volume discount. Also, deductible levels vary, depending on how much risk 
the consumer wants to take. Each service combination may be subject to a different practice, 
making it difficult to generalize social acceptability for the generic service offering.  
Consumers may also feel that pricing services vary according to their personal needs. 
Concert ticket buyers may not be looking for the most economical ticket but rather the ticket that 
will maximize their enjoyment. Thus, consumers may be willing to pay top dollar, without 
considering a price cap, for front-row tickets and the experience of a lifetime. All rules about 
social acceptability of a practice may not apply in these situations. 
Consistency in Results from Study 1 and 2. The advantage to testing the first hypothesis 
in both Study 1 with a survey and Study 2 with an experiment was the opportunity to see 
consistency in results. The same conclusions of the moderating effect of pervasiveness were 
drawn in Study 2 as in Study 1 for the four contexts with significant interactions (i.e., bananas, 
HDTV, athletic shoes, and cell phone and service). Not only did the two methods bring about the 
same results for these contexts, both actual perceptions of pervasiveness and manipulated 
pervasiveness brought the same effect on social acceptability. Whether consumers perceived 
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pervasiveness in the marketplace or they were told a practice is commonly used, pervasiveness 
moderated the procedural fairness–social acceptability relationship for these four contexts. 
The Dominating Effect of Cognitive PPF. In examining the multidimensionality of PPF, 
the impact of the cognitive assessment of PPF–outcome PPF relationship dominated over the 
affective PPF–outcome PPF relationship when a socially unacceptable price-setting practice was 
used. This was counter to the hypothesized effect. Instead of being driven by a fast, negative 
emotional response to a socially unacceptable practice, outcome PPF was driven by the slow, 
deliberate, calculative negative evaluation of the price. An explanation for this may be that the 
use of an unacceptable practice puzzles consumers and causes them to devote more cognitive 
energy, a process that prolongs their evaluation of the price. Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) 
research demonstrated that when individuals are confronted with thought-provoking information, 
they devote more cognitive effort, and the cognitive mental processing dominates their 
evaluation. In a similar way, the use of the practice may be unanticipated and, thus, the consumer 
devotes more cognitive effort to understanding the seller’s point of view, or to guessing the 
motive behind the use of the unacceptable practice, which causes cognitive PPF to drive outcome 
PPF. 
The nature of the stimuli, the numerical value of the price, may also affect the dominating 
impact of cognitive PPF. Because the value is a number, consumers may need to devote 
additional cognition evaluating it, more than they do when they evaluate an object (e.g., cake or 
fruit) that can easily be evaluated by sensory input, such as sight, hearing, or smell. In fact, some 
consumers may prefer numerical information in their evaluation processes: Viswanathan (1993) 
called this characteristic “preference for numerical information.” Preference for numerical 
information may have been a factor in the dominating impact of cognitive PPF on outcome PPF. 
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On the other hand, the affective assessment impact on outcome PPF increased when a 
socially acceptable practice was used. The increasing impact of affective PPF may have been 
because the use of the practice was anticipated and the consumer found it to be cognitively easy 
to react quickly with a positive affective response. Also, the measures for affective PPF in this 
research used strong language (i.e., rip-off, dishonest) and participants may have quickly reacted 
to see that the prices were clearly neither a rip-off nor dishonest.  
Effects on Response Behaviors. The results of Study 2 indicated that negative affective 
PPF and negative cognitive PPF both brought greater intentions for no-action, self-protection, 
and revenge-seeking behavior. The negative affective PPF–no-action behavior relationship and 
the negative cognitive PPF–revenge-seeking behavior both contradicted the hypothesized 
relationships in Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Negative affective PPF and assertiveness contributed nearly equal partial contributions in 
predicting no-action behavior in the regression analysis. Therefore, assertiveness may have 
played a large role in whether a consumer who had a negative affective PPF assessment engaged 
in no-action behavior. Assertive consumers stand up for their rights without undue anxiety 
(Richins 1983); therefore, nonassertive consumers may be less likely to take action, even when 
they have negative affective responses to price.  
Consumers who have a negative cognitive PPF assessment may partake in revenge-
seeking behavior, not because of a strong affective response such as outrage, but possibly 
because, after thinking about it, revenge-seeking may be the best way to get a strong message to 
the seller. However, the standardized regression coefficient for the affective PPF–revenge-
seeking relationship (i.e., β = -.404) was stronger than the standardized regression coefficient for 
the cognitive PPF–revenge-seeking relationship (i.e., β = -.346). This may indicate that 
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consumers with negative affective PPF assessments are more likely to partake in revenge-
seeking behavior than consumers with negative cognitive PPF assessments.   
 
Managerial Implications  
  
Reducing Unwanted Response Behaviors. Revenge-seeking behaviors can be detrimental 
to sellers. Negative word-of-mouth and online reviews can damage firm reputation and drive 
away business. Self-protection behaviors can lead frustrated consumers to complain about a price 
or ask for a refund. Sellers can help reduce these behaviors by influencing the variables that 
cause them. Specifically, sellers can aim to reduce negative cognitive PPF and negative affective 
PPF by not using socially unacceptable price-setting practices.  
The social acceptability of a price-setting practice is driven primarily by procedural 
fairness and then boosted by pervasiveness of the practice for a given context. Sellers can start 
by learning which practices are perceived as fair in the marketplace. If a fair practice is used, 
promote the use of it. For example, consumers may view consistency in pricing a product or 
service that is available both online and in-store as a procedurally fair price-setting practice. In a 
2008 advertising campaign, Circuit City promoted its pervasive use of consistency, called the 
“one price promise,” in pricing all their products or services across multiple retail outlets, 
including online, in-store, or by phone (Circuit City Website 2008). Therefore, the promotion of 
the pervasiveness of this practice should increase the procedural fairness effect on the social 
acceptability of the practice. In other words, Circuit City’s use of consistency in price-setting 
should be perceived as even more socially acceptable because of their “one price” promotion. 
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Perceptions of pervasiveness, whether correct or incorrect, can impact social acceptability 
of a practice. If consumers think the seller is using an unfair practice or if consumers do not 
know the seller is using a fair practice, social acceptability could be lessened.   
If, however, a price-setting practice is commonly used, but not procedurally fair to begin 
with, advertising the commonness of use of the practice will not improve the social acceptability 
of that practice. For example, demand pricing is perceived to be frequently used by sellers of 
athletic shoes, HDTVs, and concert tickets. “Supply and demand” is a common answer you 
might hear when asking a typical consumer how they think prices are determined. However, the 
results of this research indicate that demand pricing is a procedurally unfair practice to set prices. 
Therefore, demand pricing, regardless of how commonly it is used, is perceived to be a socially 
unacceptable price-setting practice. 
In the early 2000s, sellers, including the car manufacturer Saturn, began using a price-
setting practice called “no haggle pricing,” designed to reduce anxiety over having to negotiate 
prices and to reduce fears that dealers always get the better deals. However, the results of this 
survey indicated that price discovery, or the negotiating of prices, is a procedurally fair practice. 
This may explain the recent popularity of eBay and other new online auction sites such as Wigix, 
which uses a “bid-ask” pricing system with lower fees in efforts to pull customers away from 
eBay (Swartz and Saltzman 2008). Sellers such as Priceline have employed successful marketing 
campaigns that advertise the pervasiveness of their price-setting policy to boost social 
acceptability of their price-setting practice and, ultimately, to attract new customers.  
Sellers who, for market-driven reasons, must use a socially unacceptable price-setting 
practice should be prepared for perceptions of price unfairness and subsequent revenge-seeking 
and self-protection behaviors. Additionally, assertive consumers are more likely to partake in 
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revenge-seeking and self-protection behaviors than nonassertive consumers. Sellers should have 
customer service policies and money-back guarantees available to help such consumers cope 
with unfair prices. Also, sellers may actually benefit from response behaviors as a first step in 
improving performance (Bougie, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2003). 
Increasing Promotion Behavior. Affective PPF and cognitive PPF both had significant 
main effects on promotion behavior (e.g., spreading positive word-of-mouth, writing positive 
online reviews). To influence positive affective PPF and positive cognitive PPF, sellers should 
strive to increase social acceptability of their price-setting practice.  
Price matching was seen as the most procedurally fair and as the most socially acceptable 
price-setting practice. This held true across all the contexts—products as well as services. Thus, 
sellers who employ price-matching policies may find strong perceptions of price fairness among 
existing and future customers. For example, Circuit City promotes an “unbeatable price 
guarantee”; if a consumer finds a lower advertised price from another store, Circuit City will beat 
the competitor’s price by 10 percent of the difference (Circuit City Website 2008). Advertising 
this price-matching policy may help to promote the pervasiveness of this practice, increase social 
acceptability of the practice, and in turn increase PPF and consumer promoting behavior.  
 
Limitations 
  
The unanticipated dominating effect of cognitive PPF on outcome PPF when a socially 
unacceptable price-setting practice is used may be linked to the amount of time consumers have 
to evaluate the price-setting practice. In other words, when confronted with a socially 
unacceptable price-setting practice, consumers may devote more time to interpreting the use of 
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the practice. The survey in this research that measured cognitive PPF and affective PPF allowed 
unlimited time to evaluate the practice before rating the fairness of the price. In their article 
about cognition, affect, and customer satisfaction, Homburg, Koschate, and Hoyer (2006) 
indicated that the affective response to stimuli are evoked immediately, certainly much more 
quickly than the cognitive response. It may be that when time is limited, affective PPF dominates 
outcome PPF as hypothesized, or at least that time plays a role in the multidimensionality of 
PPF. However, time to view the stimuli and time to enter evaluations were not collected with this 
survey. 
The selection of price-setting practices and contexts to be examined in Study 1 were 
carefully considered. Consultations with marketing experts, open-ended surveys, and pretesting 
were done to get a unique and well-rounded set. However, some of the price-setting practices 
and contexts included may be considered limitations for this research. First, price discrimination 
combined discrimination by consumer physical characteristics (i.e., age, status), discrimination 
by risk characteristics such as credit scores, and discrimination by past purchase behavior such as 
membership in loyalty programs. Richer insight into how consumers perceive different types of 
price discrimination could have been gained if these levels of discrimination were broken down 
in the survey. Also, the choice for one of the contexts, cell phone with service, contained aspects 
of both product and service. Initially, the selection of cell phone and service having aspects of 
both product and service was by design, but given the differences in effects on social 
acceptability by context, it may have been more appropriate to test each context uniquely as 
product or service. It is not clear whether respondents rated the cell phone with service context 
while viewing it as a product, a service, or a combination of both.  
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The decision to split the social acceptability measure into high acceptability and low 
acceptability for hypothesis testing was justified by the task required. However, even though 
significant results were achieved, splitting the variable into two may have resulted in some lost 
data. 
The multidimensionality of PPF has not been previously tested. Thus, measures inspired 
by dual mental processing research and extant price fairness items were developed. The 
measurement of affective PPF was driven by strong language (e.g., rip-off, dishonest), while 
more passive but emotional items appeared to be indicators of cognitive PPF through exploratory 
factor analysis. Is the affective dimension of PPF measured by strong negative and positive 
emotionally charged language, or is there another way to measure affective PPF and still 
discriminate from the cognitive PPF construct?  
To reduce common methods bias in testing the first hypothesis, two methods were used: a 
survey (Study 1) and an experiment (Study 2) (Churchill 1979). Both methods yielded the same 
result (i.e., pervasiveness moderated the relationship between procedural fairness and social 
responsibility). Also, the question presentation order and selection of price-setting practices were 
randomized in Study 1. However, in Study 2, the measures for cognitive/affective PPF, outcome 
PPF, and response behaviors were collected via one method only (i.e., experiment), thereby 
possibly subjecting the results to common method bias. In efforts to reduce bias a priori, multiple 
pretests of these measures were conducted to refine and reshape the items (Churchill 1979). 
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Future Research  
  
The differences in effects on social acceptability by context call for further examination 
of the extent to which context plays a role in social acceptability of a price-setting practice. 
Specifically, the rules of fair pricing for services should be explored. Further testing of the 
moderating effects of pervasiveness should be done on additional contexts to see if it is the 
differences between products and services that are bringing about different effects, such as the 
effects observed by Bolton and Alba (2006), or if something else is driving the effect, such as 
prolonged relationship with the seller or availability of alternatives. 
In Study 2, consumer pricing knowledge had a significant partial relationship with 
outcome PPF. The more pricing knowledge a consumer had, the more unfair they rated the price.  
Familiarity with context did not have a significant relationship with outcome PPF. Are there 
other personal characteristics or behaviors that affect outcome PPF? What role does frequent 
shopping behavior have on the acceptability of a seller’s price? Are there differences in new or 
disloyal customers and loyal customers in social acceptability of a practice? 
Interestingly, both perceived pervasiveness and manipulated pervasiveness brought about 
the same moderating effect of pervasiveness on social acceptability. However, Study 1 revealed 
that consumers’ perceptions of pervasiveness were not consistent; instead they disagreed on 
whether practices are pervasive for a context, so marketers should more closely monitor how 
pervasive practices are in the marketplace. Research should be conducted to obtain accurate 
pervasive practices by context in the marketplace. In a similar way to Hardesty et al.’s (2007) 
PTPK research, objective and subjective knowledge of pervasiveness in the marketplace should 
be examined. It is likely that what consumers think they know about the commonness of a 
practice is probably different from what they actually know. On the other hand, customers in 
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B2B marketing may be more knowledgeable about price-setting practices in their respective 
marketplaces. It would be interesting to explore knowledge of pervasiveness and procedural 
fairness of B2B price-setting practices.  
The U.S. retail gasoline industry was under much pressure in the summer of 2008 
because average prices broke $4.00/gallon. An Associated Press article commenting on gasoline 
prices compared U.S. prices with prices in countries around the world. For example, the price per 
gallon in the United Kingdom was $8.46; in Mexico it was $2.54, and in the Netherlands it was 
$9.87 (Blackwell 2008). The purpose of the article was to reduce the animosity toward U.S. 
retailers by comparing the U.S. price with prices (i.e., mostly much higher prices) in other 
countries. Consumers may or may not realize the market forces at work and the difference in 
price-setting per country. In the same way, sellers expose competitors’ prices to help make their 
prices look better by comparison, but can this reduce price unfairness? Or, in a similar vein, 
could exposing competitors’ price-setting practices affect the fairness or acceptability of the 
seller’s own practice?  
The significant negative relationship between affective/cognitive PPF and no-action 
behavior sparks need for further investigation. Consumers have indicated that a price is unfair, 
but do not intend to respond accordingly. What are some of the consumer reasons for deciding 
not to participate in the various response behaviors? While high switching costs may deter some 
consumers from exiting the relationship (Urbany, Madden, and Dickson 1989), others may say 
that a price is unfair but think they have no other choice but to submit and pay the price. 
Consumers may think that they have no voice in price-setting or that their voice is not big 
enough. They might think, “Why should I say something or do something when it is not going to 
change the price?” They either pay the price or walk away. While these are just speculations, 
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future research should explore the reasons consumers do not respond to unfair prices. Consumer 
feelings of helplessness should also be explored as an antecedent to PPF, because these feelings 
may reduce perceptions of price unfairness. 
Finally, the summer 2008 media coverage on the airline industry has brought consumer 
attention to increased prices in airfare, including new price-setting practices. Poor economic 
conditions and heightened oil prices put the U.S. airlines in the difficult position of raising prices 
in creative ways (Maynard 2008). Airlines began making previously included services separate 
costs. For example, Spirit Airlines began charging for a second, third, or more checked bag 
(Stoller 2008), and U.S. Airways began charging $2 for a nonalcoholic beverage (Maynard 
2008). Called “a la carte” pricing, this new price-setting practice was initiated to allow 
consumers the option to pay only for the services they needed (Maynard 2008).  
A la carte pricing suggests some interesting topics for future research. How does this 
segregated form of price-setting compare with an integrated price-setting practice? For example, 
do consumers prefer to pay one sum and check unlimited bags, or do they prefer to pay per bag 
checked? Is it procedurally fair to use staggered pricing for checked luggage? Spirit Airlines 
charges $25 for the second bag, then $100 for each additional checked bag (Stoller 2008), but 
would it be fairer to have a uniform per-bag fee, such as $50? Does being the first to use a price-
setting practice affect perceptions of price fairness? For example, will U.S. Airlines receive more 
price unfairness perceptions simply because they were the first to charge for nonalcoholic 
beverages?  
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Conclusion 
 
Consumers evaluate market offerings, including pricing, based on available information 
in the marketplace. Previous research has examined consumer fairness judgments of an offered 
price (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Campbell 1999a, 1999b; Vaidyanathan and 
Aggarwal 2003), but little was known about fairness judgments of the process of setting prices. 
The current research investigates the effects of procedural justice (i.e., the fairness of the process 
of setting a price) on distributive justice (i.e., the fairness of an offered price) as suggested in 
Marketing Science Institute Special Report by Gebhardt (2008).  
Two determinants of the social acceptability of a price-setting practice are examined in 
two empirical studies. Procedural fairness, or the fairness of the process of setting a price, and 
the pervasiveness of a price-setting practice are both found to bring about the social acceptability 
of a price-setting practice. A practice is most socially acceptable when the practice is perceived 
as being both procedurally fair and pervasive. Therefore, consumers will be most willing to 
accept a price-setting practice if the practice is perceived as fair and if the practice is perceived to 
be commonly used to price a given product or service. Interestingly, consumers can either 
perceive the practice to be common on their own, or the seller can convince consumers that the 
practice is commonly used. Either situation will bring about stronger social acceptability 
evaluations. Thus, sellers should choose a procedurally fair practice to set prices and advertise 
the use of the practice, such as the strategy of Circuit City’s “one price promise.”  
The current research contributes to the pricing literature by gathering consumer 
evaluations of the fairness, perceived pervasiveness, and social acceptability of twelve price-
setting practices within six different product or service contexts. Consumers may perceive that a 
seller is “breaking the rules” when the seller chooses to use a socially unacceptable practice to 
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set prices. Study 2 of this research reveals the consequences of breaking the rules. A seller’s use 
of a socially unacceptable practice brings greater perceptions of price unfairness, including 
negative cognitive and affective assessments of price fairness, which, ultimately, leads to 
increased intentions of self-protection behaviors and revenge-seeking behaviors. When 
consumers negatively evaluate a price-setting practice they are likely not only to negatively 
evaluate the offered price, but they are also likely to complain, spread negative word-of-mouth 
criticisms, or post negative online reviews. On the other hand, when a seller uses a socially 
acceptable price-setting practice, consumers are more likely to positively evaluate an offered 
price and engage in promotion behavior, such as spreading positive word-of-mouth and posting 
positive online reviews. An interesting finding is that even though consumers may perceive a 
price to be unfair, they may not respond to the price at all. Future research may reveal that 
consumers may perceive that complaining or engaging in other self-protection or revenge-
seeking behaviors may be not worth the cost or effort. 
Previous price-fairness literature has suggested that perceptions of price fairness may not 
be unidimensional (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). The current research has produced evidence 
that both a cognitive and an affective assessment of price fairness exists, and that use of price-
setting practice can bring about changes in impact of cognitive and affective assessment on 
outcome price fairness perceptions. When a seller chooses to use an unacceptable price-setting 
practice, and when given unlimited time to evaluate a price, consumers’ cognitive assessment 
will dominate the outcome of their price-fairness perceptions. In other words, for an 
unacceptable price-setting practice such as random pricing, consumers’ cognitive evaluation of 
the price (e.g., that it is justified, expected, and reasonable) will be more important than affective 
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evaluation of the price (e.g., that it is dishonest, a rip-off, and questionable) in determining their 
price-fairness perceptions.  
To conclude, sellers who break the rules in setting prices should expect that consumers 
may devote cognitive energy in evaluating a price, possibly have negative fairness perceptions of 
the price, and behave in ways that are harmful to the seller. Sellers who follow the rules by using 
an acceptable price-setting practice can likely expect perceptions of price fairness, which can 
lead to consumer behaviors that promote the seller. 
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Tables  
Table 1: PPF Research: Determinants, Response Behaviors and Scales 
 
 Determinants 
Response 
Behaviors to 
PPF 
PPF Scale 
Campbell 
(2007) 
Source of price information; 
inferred motive; affect  3 items 
Haws and 
Bearden 
(2006) 
Dynamic pricing; pricing variances 
across consumers 
Satisfaction with 
purchase 9 items  
Bolton and 
Alba (2006) 
Alignability of cost-price increase; 
service/goods  1 item 
Maxwell 
(2005) Complexity of choice 
Likelihood of 
purchase 1 item  
Homburg, 
Hoyer, and 
Koschate 
(2005) 
Satisfaction; Negative Motive Repurchase intentions 
3 items (i.e., 
motive fairness)  
Xia and 
Monroe (2005) 
Transaction characteristics, source 
of comparison, seller’s reaction to 
complaint 
Negative emotions, 
purchase intention, 
desire to engage in 
negative WOM 
6 items 
Kukar-Kinney, 
Xia, and 
Monroe (2005) 
Price-matching guarantees (e.g., 
policy fairness); motive 
Consumer perceived 
value and shopping 
intentions 
NA 
Grewal, 
Hardesty, and 
Iyer (2004) 
Price segmentation tactics: buyer 
identification, purchase timing on 
internet 
Repurchase 
intentions 3 items 
Bolton, 
Warlop, and 
Alba (2003) 
Reference points; information about 
profit/cost of goods sold; cuing of 
costs 
 1 item 
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Babin, 
Hardesty, and 
Suter (2003) 
Color and lights, price 
Patronage intentions 
and purchase 
intentions 
2 items 
Vaidyanathan 
and Aggarwal 
(2003)  
Locus of cause, controllability  3 items 
Campbell 
(1999a) Inferred motive Shopping intentions 1 item 
Campbell 
(1999b) 
Inferred motive; inferred relative 
profit; reputation Shopping intentions 1 item 
Dickson and 
Kalapurakal 
(1994) 
Cost-based increases  1 item 
Frey and 
Pommerehne 
(1993) 
Excess, scarce demand, allocation  1 item 
Kalapurakal, 
Dickson, and 
Urbrany 
(1991) 
Dual Entitlement; rules based on 
market vs cost prices; traders 
familiarity 
Complaining, refuse 
to buy, continue 
business 
1 item 
Oliver and 
Swan (1989) 
Buyer’s inputs/outputs, seller’s 
inputs/outputs Satisfaction 3 items 
Kahneman, 
Knetsch and 
Thaler (1986) 
Cost-plus pricing  1 item 
Huppertz, 
Arenson, and 
Evans (1978) 
Level of price inequity, service 
inequity, shopping frequency and 
item cost 
 
3 items (i.e., 
good/bad, nice-
awful) 
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Table 2: Two Dimensions of PPF 
 
 
 
 
PPF 
   
Assessment………………….. Cognitive Affective 
Speed of processing………… Slow Rapid 
Basis of evaluation………….. Rules based Feelings based 
Response……………………. Controlled Automatic 
Process for conclusion……… Deductive Emotional 
Control over assessment……. Deliberative Reflexive 
 
 83
Table 3: Price-Setting Practice Descriptions  
 
Price-setting Practice Description 
1. Absorption Pricing Keep prices constant even when costs increase or costs decrease (Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994) 
2. Captive Pricing 
Set price for initial product very low because seller knows 
consumer will eventually need to buy replacement parts at a 
higher price point (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
a – When costs increase, seller increases price in the same 
ratio; when costs decrease, seller decreases price in the same 
ratio (Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994) 
3. Cost Plus b – Seller sets prices by taking into account costs to the 
seller, including COGS, labor costs, rent costs, etc, plus a 
designated mark-up (e.g., 5% mark-up) (Bolton, Warlop, and 
Alba 2003) 
4. Demand-based Pricing 
Charging different prices, not based on different 
products/quality, but based on the demand for the product 
(e.g., lunch versus dinner time meals) (Kimes and Wirtz 
2002) 
5. Demand Price-setting  Setting price in anticipation of demand increases (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) 
6. No Haggle Pricing Prices are nonnegotiable (e.g., Saturn automobiles) (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
7. Partitioned Pricing 
Dividing a product’s price into two mandatory parts rather 
than charging a combined, all-inclusive price (Hardesty, 
Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
8. Penetration Pricing For a new product, using low prices as a wedge to get into mass markets early (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
9. Price Bundling 
The sale of two or more separate products in a package at a 
discount, without any integration of the products (Hardesty, 
Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
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10. Price Discovery 
Dynamic Pricing 
Negotiated dynamic pricing where consumers have input 
into setting the final price; where prices vary over time, 
consumers, and/or circumstances (Haws and Bearden 2006, 
p. 305) 
11. Price Discrimination 
When a company sells a product or service at two or more 
prices that do not reflect a proportional difference in costs 
(Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
12. Price Matching An offer to match the lowest price available in the market (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
13. Price Skimming 
The seller sets the price high for consumers who are willing 
to pay high prices for brand new products (Hardesty, 
Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
14. Quality Based Pricing 
When there are different prices, based on quality, for 
products in the same product category (Bolton, Warlop, and 
Alba 2003, p. 480) 
15. Random Discounting 
To obtain sales from both consumers who carefully search 
for low prices and consumers who do not check prices 
carefully (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
16. Risk Based Pricing Setting prices higher for products that may be more risky to the marketer (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003, p. 480) 
17. Seasonal Pricing Price reductions for merchandise or services out of season (Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
18. Shortage Price-setting Setting price in anticipation of supply shortages (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) 
19. Volume Strategy  
Charge a lower price, which results in increase in sales, with 
a lower margin per sale but higher volume in sales (Bolton, 
Warlop, and Alba 2003, p. 481) 
20. Yield Management 
To help the seller sell the right inventory unit to the right 
customer at the right time and for the right price; to allocate 
undifferentiated units of limited capacity to available 
demand in a way that maximizes profit (Kimes 2002, p. 22) 
 
 Table 4: Criteria for Product/Service Selection for Study 1 
 
 Low Priced 
High 
Priced 
Non-
Durable Durable Necessity Luxury 
Sold 
Online 
Sold 
Both 
Online 
& 
Bricks/
Mortar 
Sold at 
Bricks/
Mortar 
Strictly a 
Product 
Aspects 
of Both  
Product 
& 
Service 
Strictly a 
Service 
Athletic 
Shoes  4.84*  5.40*  3.55   4.07* 1.74*   
Automobile 
Insurance  5.91*  3.98 1.39*   3.70    5.70* 
Bananas 1.77*  2.54*  2.70*    6.49* 1.23*   
Cell Phone 
& Service  4.49*  4.26* 2.61*    4.21*   3.96* 
Concert 
Tickets  5.07* 3.18   5.82*  3.35    4.54* 
HDTV  5.63*  4.82*  5.69*   4.18*  3.25  
* The mean is statistically different from the midpoint (i.e., 3.5) at p<.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Subset of PTPK for Consumer Price-Setting Knowledge 
(Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson 2007) 
True/False/Don’t Know 
 
Price-setting Practice Item 
1. Captive Pricing 
“$3.00 for a non-disposable, easy grip razon, and $10.00 for a 
package of 8 replacement razor blades.”  Captive pricing is 
used by marketers in order to take advantage of the fact that, 
eventually, consumers will need to purchase the high-priced 
replacement components if they want to continue using the 
product. TRUE 
2. No Haggle Pricing 
“All automobiles for sale at the lowest price possible-no 
haggling!!” No haggle pricing is used by marketers in order to 
convince buyers that negotiations will be fair. FALSE 
3. Partitioned Pricing 
“$30.00 for a button-up, 100% cotton long-sleeve shirt, plus 
$5.00 for shipping and handling.” Partitioned pricing is used 
by marketers to persuade consumers that the marketer is 
offering an attractive shipping and handling rate.  FALSE 
4. Penetration Pricing 
“A four-pack of a new brand of AA batteries -- $2.00.” 
Penetration pricing is used by marketers so that, by setting 
prices low, consumers will be encouraged to try the product.  
TRUE 
5. Price Bundling  
“Computer having a 1.1 GHz processor and 128 MB memory 
and laserjet printer for $1100.”  Price bundling is used by 
marketers in order to increase revenue over what would have 
been obtained had the products been priced separately.  TRUE 
6. Price Skimming 
“Brand new product—videophone $500.”  Price skimming is 
used by marketers to appeal to consumers who are willing to 
pay a high price for a new product.  TRUE 
7. Random Discounting 
“A brand of orange juice’s (64 oz or ½ gallon) price over a 
four-week time period was as follows: Week 1 $2.50, Week 2 
$2.50, Week 3 $1.50, Week 4 $2.50.”  Random discounting is 
used to obtain sales from both consumers who carefully search 
for low prices and consumers who do not check prices 
carefully. TRUE 
  
Table 6: Study 1 Correlations – Fairness, Pervasiveness and Social Acceptability 
 
Correlations (r) 
Procedural 
Fairness 
P - 
Bananas P - HDTV 
P - Athletic 
Shoes 
P - Concert 
Tickets 
P - Auto 
Insurance 
P - Cell 
Phone & 
Service 
        
SA - Bananas .570* .342*      
SA - HDTV .626*  .167*     
SA - Athletic Shoes .613*   .250*    
SA - Concert Tickets .556*    .156*   
SA - Auto Insurance .537*     .176*  
SA - Cell Phone & 
Service .640*      .216* 
       
 
SA = Social Acceptability, P = Pervasiveness 
*Significant at p<.01
 Table 7: Study 1 Results – Complex Regression Analysis Results 
 
    Fairness Pervasiveness Fairness x Pervasiveness    
  
ICC Β0 β1 SE p β2 SE p β3 SE p R2 SE p 
SA - Bananas 
 
.087 3.425 .582 .029 .000 .278 .028 .000 .051* .012 .000 .420 .030 .000 
SA - HDTV 
 
.084 3.694 .648 .028 .000 .159 .028 .000 .025* .012 .037 .419 .032 .000 
SA - Athletic Shoes 
 
.095 3.580 .614 .028 .000 .219 .028 .000 .046* .011 .000 .436 .031 .000 
SA - Concert Tickets 
 
.134 3.730 .599 .031 .000 .178 .031 .000 .006 .013 .671 .341 .032 .000 
SA - Auto Insurance 
 
.074 3.340 .567 .029 .000 .212 .033 .000 .021 .014 .139 .333 .030 .000 
SA - Cell Phone & 
Service 
 
.038 3.689 .644 .027 .000 .188 .029 .000 .030* .012 .012 .445 .031 .000 
SA = Social Acceptability 
* Interaction term is significant (p<.05). 
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Table 8: Study 1 Results – Simple Slopes for Regression Equations 
 
 
Bananas Regression Equation 
Y = 3.425 +.582fair + .278perv + .051(fair*perv) 
 
Simple Slopes 
Pervhigh = 3, Ŷ = .735fair + 4.259 
Pervmean = 0, Ŷ = .582fair + 3.425 
Pervlow = -3, Ŷ = .429fair + 2.591 
 
 
HDTV Regression Equation 
Y = 3.694 +.648fair + .159perv + .025(fair*perv) 
 
Simple Slopes 
Pervhigh = 3, Ŷ = .723fair + 4.171 
Pervmean = 0, Ŷ =.648fair + 3.694 
Pervlow = -3, Ŷ = .573fair + 3.217 
 
 
Athletic Shoes Regression Equation 
Y = 3.580 +.614fair + .219perv + .046(fair*perv) 
 
Simple Slopes 
Pervhigh = 3, Ŷ = .752fair + 4.237 
Pervmean = 0, Ŷ =.614fair + 3.580 
Pervlow = -3, Ŷ = .476fair + 2.923 
 
 
Concert Tickets Regression Equation 
Y = 3.730 +.599fair + .178perv + .006(fair*perv) 
 
Simple Slopes 
Pervhigh = 3, Ŷ = .617fair + 4.264 
Pervmean = 0, Ŷ =.599fair + 3.730 
Pervlow = -3, Ŷ = .593fair + 3.196 
 
 
Auto Insurance Regression Equation 
Y = 3.340 +.567fair + .212perv + .021(fair*perv) 
 
Simple Slopes 
Pervhigh = 3, Ŷ = .630fair + 3.976 
Pervmean = 0, Ŷ =.567fair + 3.340 
Pervlow = -3, Ŷ = .504fair + 2.704 
 
 
Cell Phone and Service Regression Equation 
Y = 3.689 +.644fair + .188perv + .03(fair*perv) 
 
Simple Slopes 
Pervhigh = 3, Ŷ = .734fair + 4.253 
Pervmean = 0, Ŷ =.644fair + 3.689 
Pervlow = -3, Ŷ = .554fair + 3.125 
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Table 9: Study 1 Results – Pervasiveness and Procedural Fairness Means 
 
 Pervasiveness (1=Extremely Uncommon, 7=Extremely Common) 
 Bananas HDTV Athletic Shoes 
Concert 
Tickets 
Auto 
Insurance 
Cell 
Phone & 
Service 
Fairness 
(1=Extremely Unfair, 
7= Extremely Fair) 
Price Discrimination 2.21 3.27 2.66 3.16 5.66 4.45 1.90 
Inside Info Supply Pricing 5.36 4.89 4.73 5.73 3.72 4.25 2.44 
Random Discounting* 3.77 4.64 4.26 5.05 4.18 4.65 2.50 
Demand Pricing 4.42 4.85 4.85 4.96 4.00 4.85 3.33 
Price Skimming 2.93 5.90 5.15 5.24 3.84 5.28 3.40 
Captive Pricing 2.41 3.55 3.01 2.95 3.54 4.55 4.53 
Price Bundling 3.20 3.52 3.0 4.14 4.77 5.48 4.53 
Volume Pricing 4.04 3.35 3.62 3.94 4.43 4.86 4.77 
Price Discovery 3.08 3.46 2.99 4.13 3.55 3.57 4.77 
Cost Plus Pricing* 5.20 5.53 5.62 5.00 4.77 5.14 4.96 
Penetration Pricing 3.48 3.60 3.37 3.52 3.76 4.76 5.05 
Price Matching 4.85 4.85 4.60 3.94 4.57 4.68 5.60 
*Selected for Study 2 
 Table 10: Study 1 Results – Socially Acceptable and Unacceptable Price-Setting Practices 
(Social acceptability mean in parentheses, 1=Extremely Unacceptable, 7=Extremely Acceptable) 
 Bananas HDTV Athletic Shoes Concert Tickets Auto Insurance 
Cell Phone & 
Service 
       
Matching (5.53) Matching (5.76) Matching (5.46) Matching (5.40) Matching (5.44) Matching (5.50) 
Cost Plus (4.82) Penetration (4.87) Cost Plus (4.92) Penetration (4.77)  Cost Plus (4.72) 
Socially 
Acceptable 
Practices* Penetration  (4.62) Cost Plus (4.76) Penetration (4.81) Cost Plus (4.68)  Penetration (4.65) 
       
Discrimin (1.57) Discrimin. (1.87) Discrimin. (1.72) Discrimin. (1.91) Random (2.05) Discrimin. (2.32) 
Skimming (2.49) Random (2.80) Random (2.71) Random (2.89) Inside Info (2.09) Inside Info (2.44) 
Random (2.68) Inside Info (2.99) Inside Info (2.83) Inside Info (3.12) Skimming (2.38) Random (2.52) 
Inside Info (2.74) Demand (3.42) Demand (3.27) Demand (3.45) Demand (2.52) Demand (3.00) 
Demand (3.05)  Bundling (3.49)  Discrimin. (2.80) Skimming (3.57) 
Discovery (3.30)  Captive (3.55)  Captive (3.35)  
Bundling (3.48)  Discovery (3.55)    
Socially 
Unacceptable 
Practices** 
Captive (3.58)  Skimming (3.55)    
       
Volume (4.33) Discovery (3.78) Volume (3.83) Bundling (3.84) Penetration (4.37) Bundling (4.23) 
 Captive (3.77)  Captive (3.68) Cost Plus (4.22) Captive (4.02) 
 Skimming (3.67)  Volume (3.68) Discovery (3.77) Volume (3.88) 
 Bundling (3.63)  Skimming (3.63) Bundling (3.68) Discovery (3.77) 
Neither 
Socially 
Acceptable 
Nor 
Unacceptable 
Practices  Volume (3.61)  Discovery (3.45) Volume (3.68)  
*Socially acceptable practices were statistically greater than midpoint (i.e., >4.00, p<.05). 
**Socially unacceptable practices were statistically less than midpoint (i.e., <4.00, p<.05). 
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Table 11: Multidimensionality of PPF Item Selection Survey Results 
 
*Selected as items for Study 2. 
Cognitive Assessment of PPF 
% 
Agreement of 
Classification
 Affective Assessment of PPF 
% 
Agreement of 
Classification
1) All things considered, this price is justified.* 100%  1) This price is a rip-off.* 100% 
2) This is the price that I would expect to pay.* 75%  2) I’d be happy with the price.* 88% 
3) The value of the product may not be worth the 
price.* 88%  3) This price is an outrage. 88% 
4) This is a reasonable price. 63%  4) I’d be completely satisfied with this price.* 63% 
   5) This price is dishonest.* 69% 
     
Additional Suggested Items  Additional Suggested Items 
5) This price is inline with other similar products.  6) I am pleasantly surprised by this price.* 
6) The price is reasonable considering what I am getting in return.  7) I’d feel good about paying this price. 
7) People who know the market would find this to be a reasonable 
price.*  8) This price just feels right.* 
8) The price is fair to all.  9) I couldn’t believe the price. 
   10) I would feel bad if I had to pay this price. 
   11) I wouldn’t think twice about a price like that. 
   12) This price is questionable.* 
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Table 12: Response Behaviors Item Selection Survey Results 
 
 % Agreement of Classification 
 Revenge-Seeking 
Self-
Protection 
No  
Action Promotion 
     
1) Express your disapproval to other customers in the store? 100%    
2) Post negative online reviews? 94% 13%   
3) Make negative comments to friends or family? 81% 44%   
4) Call or write to the Better Business Bureau or other consumer organization so 
that as many people as possible would hear about my negative experience? 69% 38%   
5) Seek legal action against the seller, store, or company? 63% 50%   
6) Express your disapproval to the store manager?  88% 19%  
7) Send a complaint to company headquarters? 19% 75%   
8) In the future, based on this offer and what you know about the retailer, would 
you shop a lot less, a little less, about the same, a little more, or a lot more? 31% 81% 94% 88% 
9) Buy the HDTV from this retailer?   56%  
10) Express your approval to the store manager?   25% 75% 
11) Express your approval to other customers in the store?    94% 
12) Give positive recommendations to friends or family?    94% 
13) Post positive online reviews about the retailer?    94% 
Bolded percents are the highest percent agreement of classification of item.
 Table 13: Study 2 Results – Varimax Rotated Factor Analysis 
Multidimensionality of PPF 
  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Price is justified* .807 .238 
Price is expected* .798 .252 
Price is reasonable* .725 .100 
Happy with price .821 .268 
Satisfied with price .795 .375 
Price feels right .805 .336 
Pleasantly surprised by price .584 .267 
Price is questionable** .303 .773 
Price is rip-off** .258 .781 
Price is dishonest** .211 .812 
Product is not worth price .227 .765 
   
Eigenvalues 5.968 1.373 
*Used as items for cognitive assessment PPF (Cronbach alpha = .818). 
**Used as items for affective assessment PPF (Cronbach alpha = .827). 
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Table 14: Study 2 Results – Varimax Rotated Factor Analysis Response 
Behaviors 
  
 Factor 1 Factor2 Factor 3 
Disapproval to other customers* .765 -.028 -.278 
Negative WOM* .635 -.351 -.101 
Negative online reviews* .796 -.021 -.013 
Complain to BBB* .836 .001 -.188 
Take legal action .693 .109 .037 
Disapproval to manager** .765 -.028 -.300 
Complain to headquarters** .849 -.015 -.160 
Approval to manager*** .067 .866 -.027 
Approval to other customers*** .063 .883 -.094 
Positive WOM*** -.164 .717 .408 
Positive online reviews*** .040 .760 .267 
Not affect behavior**** -.331 .237 .616 
Shop about the same**** -.109 .092 .867 
No purchase intention .321 -.621 -.399 
    
Eigenvalues 5.218 3.092 1.032 
*Used as items for revenge-seeking behavior (Cronbach alpha = .828). 
**Used as items for self-protection behavior (Cronbach alpha = .803). 
***Used as items for promotion behavior (Cronbach alpha = .847). 
****Used as items for no-action behavior (Cronbach alpha = .653). 
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Table 15: Study 2 Results – The Effect of a Socially Acceptable Price-Setting 
Practice 
 
 Partial R2 
F 
Change p 
 
Β p 
       
Use of a Socially Acceptable Price-
Setting Practice .085* 14.143 .000 
 .295* .000 
       
Consumer Pricing Knowledge** .038* 5.708 .018 
 
-.207* .008 
Consumer Familiarity with Context** .011 1.641 .202 
 
.063 .425 
       
*Significant at p<.05. 
**Covariates included in regression model. 
 Table 16: Study 2 Results – The Multidimensionality of PPF 
 
 Parameter Low Social Acceptability  
High Social 
Acceptability Conclusion 
      
Cognitive Assessment 
 of PPF Β3,1 .840* > .615* 
  (.124)  (.121) 
     
Affective Assessment  
of PPF Β3,2 .282* < .473* 
  (.075)  (.117) 
H3 Partially 
Supported 
* Parameter is significant at p<.05, standard errors are in parentheses.  
 Table 17: Study 2 Results – Multidimensionality Effects on Response Behaviors 
 
 H4: Affective PPF Effects on Response Behaviors 
 Affective PPF Effects Assertiveness** Aggressiveness** 
 Partial R2 
F 
Change β 
H4 
Support 
Partial 
R2 
F 
Change β 
Partial 
R2 
F 
Change β 
No-Action .022 5.129* -.152* No .019 4.428* -.165* .012 2.694 -.080 
Self-Protection .103 30.378* -.331* Yes .070 18.297* .251* .069 16.731* .094 
Revenge-Seeking .153 45.752* -.404* Yes .059 14.735* .218* .045 10.518* .633 
Promotion .130 33.473* .372*  .008 1.744 .134* .002 .492 -.013 
  
 H5: Cognitive PPF Effects on Response Behaviors 
 Cognitive PPF Effects Assertiveness** Aggressiveness** 
 Partial R2 
F 
Change β 
H5 
Support 
Partial 
R2 
F 
Change β 
Partial 
R2 
F 
Change β 
No-Action .034 8.085* -.190* Yes .017 4.009* -.166* .011 2.593 -.083 
Self-Protection .104 30.549* -.333* Yes .059 15.238* .217* .073 17.834* .115 
Revenge-Seeking .111 31.461* -.346* No .051 12.639* .194* .047 11.022* .064 
Promotion .278 86.972* .546*  .006 1.407 .161* .002 .480 .018 
           
*Significant terms, p<.05 
**Covariates included in the regression models.
 Figures 
 
Figure 1: Xia, Monroe, and Cox’s (2004) Conceptual Framework of PPF 
 
 Figure 2: Xia, Monroe, and Cox’s (2004) Conceptual Framework of PPF--Updated 
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 Figure 3: A Conceptual Model of the Rules of Fair Pricing and PPF 
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Figure 4: The Hypothesized Moderating Effect of Perceived Pervasiveness  
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Figure 5: Study 2 Results – Actual Effect of Pervasiveness 
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Figure 6 Study 2 Results – Multi-group Analysis to Test Multidimensionality 
of PPF 
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 Charts 
Chart 1: Study 1 Results – Social Acceptability, Pervasiveness and Fairness Means for Bananas 
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  Chart 2: Study 1 Results – Social Acceptability, Pervasiveness and Fairness Means for HDTV 
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Chart 3: Study 1 Results – Social Acceptability, Pervasiveness and Fairness Means for Athletic Shoes 
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Chart 4: Study 1 Results – Social Acceptability, Pervasiveness and Fairness Means for Concert Tickets 
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Chart 5: Study 1 Results – Social Acceptability, Pervasiveness and Fairness Means for Auto Insurance 
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Chart 6: Study 1 Results – Social Acceptability, Pervasiveness and Fairness Means for Cell Phone & Service 
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 Charts 7-12: Study 1 Results – Distribution of Perceived Pervasiveness of 
Practice for HDTVs 
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Charts 13-18: Study 1 Results – Distribution of Perceived Pervasiveness of 
Practice for HDTVs 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Pretest Study 1 Price-Setting Practices 
 
1. When new products or services are first introduced to the market, the price is set higher 
for those people who want the product or service as soon as it is introduced into the 
marketplace.  (Price Skimming) 
 
2. When new products or services are first introduced to the market, the price is set lower to 
get lots of people to buy it.  (Penetration Pricing) 
 
3. If a person buys a package or a “bundle” of products or services, the seller has one price 
when they are purchased at the same time and a different price if the buyer were to buy 
the products or services separately. Whether purchased together or separately, the 
products or services still function the same.  (Price Bundling) 
 
4. Within a set price range, sellers offer the product or service at different prices on a 
random basis.  Different people will pay different prices depending on when they buy.  
Those who are more aware of prices charged may be able to purchase at a lower price.  
(Random Discounting) 
 
5. The seller sets what it considers an appropriate price and then sells only at the price to 
every buyer.  The seller does not offer sales or negotiate the price and advertises this as a 
promise to buyers.  (No Haggle Pricing) 
 
6. The seller sets the initial price of a product lower, knowing that consumers will need to 
buy refills, recharges, or replacement parts or services over time.  (Captive Pricing) 
 
7. Rather than quote a single total price, the seller quotes one price for the product or 
service and a separate price from the required shipping, delivery, and/or accessories.  
(Partitioned Pricing) 
 
8. The seller sets different prices for different groups of customers based on customer 
characteristics, such as age. The different prices do not reflect any difference in cost to 
the seller.  (Price Discrimination) 
 
9. The seller sets different prices for different groups of customers depending upon how 
much they use.  Higher volume users pay lower per unit costs.  (Volume Discounting) 
 
10. The seller sets its price to match the lowest price offering by its competitors in the 
market.  (Price Matching) 
 
11. The seller sets the price of a product or service by taking into account its total costs then 
adds a “markup” to achieve its desired profit.  (Cost Plus) 
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12. The seller sets a price that allows it to maintain that price, regardless of fluctuations in its 
own costs.  (Absorption Pricing) 
 
13. The seller charges higher prices for better quality products or services and charges lower 
prices for lesser quality products or services.  (Quality Pricing) 
 
14. The seller sets the price higher for products or services that are more risky to stock 
because they have a limited shelf-life or are unique items that may be difficult to sell.  
The seller sets the price lower for products or services that are less risky for the seller to 
stock.  (Risk-based Pricing) 
 
15. The seller sets the exact price for a particular buyer based characteristics like the buyer’s 
credit history.  (Credit Risk Pricing) 
 
16. A seller with a fixed quantity of product or service sets different prices depending on 
when customers buy with the goal of selling all available product or services.  People 
using the exact same product or service at the same time may have paid different prices.  
(Yield Management) 
 
17. The price of a product or service is negotiated between the seller and one or more buyers. 
Each offers the price they are willing to accept or pay until a final price is agreed upon.  
(Price Discovery) 
 
18. The seller sets the price based on customer demand for the product or service.  When the 
customer demand is high, the price is set higher.  When the customer demand is low, the 
price is set lower.  (Demand Pricing) 
 
19. When there is an unexpected increase in customer demand for a product or service 
predicted, the seller sets the price of that product or service higher.  (Inside Information 
Demand Pricing) 
 
20. The seller sets the price based on the marketplace availability of a product or the capacity 
of a service.  When there is lots of product or service capacity available in the 
marketplace, the price is set lower.  When the product or service capacity is limited, the 
price is set higher.  (Supply Pricing) 
 
21. When there is an unexpected shortage of a product or service predicted, the seller sets the 
price of that product or service higher.  (Inside Information Supply Pricing) 
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Appendix B: Final List of Price-Setting Practices for Study 1 
 
1. When a new product or service is first introduced, the price is set high for those people 
who want it as soon as it is available. (Price Skimming) 
 
2. When a new product or service is first introduced, the price is set lower to get lots of 
people to buy it. (Penetration Pricing) 
 
3. If a person buys a package or a “bundle” of products or services, the seller has one price 
when they are sold together and a different price if they are sold separately.  Whether 
purchased together or separately, there is no difference in the products or services. (Price 
Bundling) 
 
4. Within a set price range, the seller offers the product or service at different prices on a 
random basis.  So different people will pay different prices depending on when they buy. 
(Random Discounting) 
 
5. The seller sets the initial price lower, knowing that consumers will need to buy refills, 
recharges, or replacement parts over time. (Captive Pricing) 
 
6. The seller sets different prices for different groups of customers based on customer 
characteristics, such as age or credit history.  The different prices do not reflect any 
difference in costs to the seller. (Price Discrimination) 
 
7. Depending upon how much people buy, the seller sets different prices.  Those who buy 
more pay lower per unit costs. (Volume Discounting) 
 
8. The seller sets its price to match the lowest average price offered by its competitors in 
their market. (Price Matching) 
 
9. The seller determines its total cost, then adds a “mark-up” to achieve its profit.  That 
determines the final price. (Cost Plus) 
 
10. The price is negotiated between the seller and one or more buyers.  Each offers the price 
they are willing to accept or pay until a final price is agreed upon. (Price Discovery) 
 
11. The seller sets the price based on customer demand.  When the customer demand is high, 
the price is set higher.  When the customer demand is low, the price is set lower. 
(Demand Pricing) 
 
12. When there is an unexpected shortage predicted, the seller sets the price of that product or 
service higher. (Inside Information Supply Pricing) 
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Appendix C: Study 1 Context Selection Survey 
 
  
 
Default Question Block
Welcome! 
 
People often classify products or services in different ways.  The purpose of this survey is to 
learn how people like you think about various products or services in the marketplace.  Your 
participation in this survey is voluntary and you may stop the survey at any time.   
 
You will be asked to think about several different products and/or services.  For each, you will 
be asked to evaluate the product/service with several descriptive statements.   
 
To begin the survey, click on the arrow below. 
HDTV
 
 
Think about a high definition television (HDTV).   
 
Below are a number of statements that could be used to describe an HDTV.  For each pair of 
adjective phrases, please mark the space that best describes your opinion about HDTVs. 
1. 
Low Priced High Priced 
       
2. 
NOT Very 
Durable 
Very Durable 
       
3. 
A Necessity A Luxury 
       
4. 
Sold Purely Sold Purely in 
  
 
 
 
 
Online (Both) 
Traditional 
Stores 
       
5. 
Purely a Product (Both) Purely a Service
       
Concert Tickets
 
 
 
Think about Concert Tickets. 
 
Below are a number of statements that could be used to describe concert tickets.  For each pair 
of adjective phrases, please mark the space that best describes your opinion about concert 
tickets. 
1. 
Low Priced High Priced 
       
2. 
NOT Very 
Durable 
Very Durable 
       
3. 
A Necessity A Luxury 
       
4. 
Sold Purely 
Online 
(Both) 
Sold Purely in 
Traditional 
Stores 
       
  
 
 
 
5. 
Purely a Product (Both) Purely a Service
       
Cell Phone
 
 
 
Think about Cell Phones with Service. 
 
Below are a number of statements that could be used to describe cell phones with service.  For 
each pair of adjective phrases, please mark the space that best describes your opinion about 
cell phones with service. 
1. 
Low Priced High Priced 
       
2. 
NOT Very 
Durable 
Very Durable 
       
3. 
A Necessity A Luxury 
       
4. 
Sold Purely 
Online 
(Both) 
Sold Purely in 
Traditional 
Stores 
       
  
 
 
 
 
5. 
Purely a Product (Both) Purely a Service
       
Bananas
 
 
 
Think about Fresh Bananas. 
 
Below are a number of statements that could be used to describe bananas.  For each pair of 
adjective phrases, please mark the space that best describes your opinion about bananas. 
1. 
Low Priced High Priced 
       
2. 
NOT Very 
Durable 
Very Durable 
       
3. 
A Necessity A Luxury 
       
4. 
Sold Purely 
Online 
(Both) 
Sold Purely in 
Traditional 
Stores 
       
5. 
Purely a Product (Both) Purely a Servie 
       
  
 
 
 
Athletic Shoes
 
 
Think about a pair of athletic shoes. 
 
Below are a number of statements that could be used to describe athletic shoes.  For each pair 
of adjective phrases, please mark the space that best describes your opinion about athletic 
shoes. 
1. 
Low Priced High Priced 
       
2. 
NOT Very 
Durable 
Very Durable 
       
3. 
A Necessity A Luxury 
       
4. 
Sold Purely 
Online 
(Both) 
Sold Purely in 
Traditional 
Stores 
       
5. 
Purely a Product (Both) Purely a Service
       
Auto Insurance
  
 
 
 
 
 
Think about automobile insurance. 
 
Below are a number of statements that could be used to describe automobile insurance.  For 
each pair of adjective phrases, please mark the space that best describes your opinion about 
automobile insurance. 
1. 
Low Priced High Priced 
       
2. 
NOT Very 
Durable 
Very Durable 
       
3. 
A Necessity A Luxury 
       
4. 
Sold Purely 
Online 
(Both) 
Sold Purely in 
Traditional 
Stores 
       
5. 
Purely a Product (Both) Purely a Service
       
Demos
Please tell us a little about yourself.  This information will be used for classification purposes and used only in 
aggregate form. 
  
 
   
  
Please select your gender. 
Male Female 
  
Please select the age category that best describes you. 
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 or older
The next two questions are necessary for you to get credit for participating in this survey. They will not be used to 
identify your answers. 
What is your instructor's name? 
Please type in your name. 
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Appendix D: Study 1 Survey 
 Default Question Block 
 
 
 
Welcome! 
 
Your opinions are important to us! You are one of a small group of consumers asked to 
participate in this study. 
 
We want to know what people like you think about how prices are set.  It will help 
businesses be more attentive to customer opinions. 
 
Participation is easy!  You'll read about different ways that the selling price for various 
products and services might be set.  Then we want your honest opinion about each. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For your gift for participating, you'll get instructions from the online panel company on 
how to receive it. 
 
To qualify, you must be 21 years of age or older and do at least some of the shopping for 
your household.   
 
 
If you need more information, please contact Jodie Ferguson at jferguson@gsu.edu or 
(404)413-7650, or Susan Vogtner at (404)413-3513. 
To begin, click on the arrow below.   
  
z There are no right or wrong answers.  
z Your answers are anonymous, meaning that your name will not be 
connected in any way to your answers.  
z The survey should take less than 15 minutes to complete.  
z There is no known risk to participating in this online survey beyond 
what you experience in your normal day of life.  
z Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary 
and you may stop at any time without losing any benefits.  
Fairness of Pricing Practices 
 
To set the price that customers will pay, businesses can use a variety of 
price‐setting practices.  A business may use only one practice or may use 
multiple ones. 
 
Following are descriptions of different ways that businesses might set 
prices. We are interested in how fair you think each practice is.  
Fairness 
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
When a new product or service is first introduced, the price is set high for those 
people who want it as soon as it is available. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
When a new product or service is first introduced, the price is set lower to 
get lots of people to buy it. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
If a person buys a package or a "bundle" of products or services, the seller has 
one price when they are sold together and a different price if they are sold 
separately.  Whether purchased together or separately, there is no difference in 
the products or services. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
Within a set price range, the seller offers the product or service at different 
prices on a random basis.  So different people will pay different prices 
depending on when they buy. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
The seller sets the initial price lower, knowing that consumers will need to buy 
refills, rechargers, or replacement parts over time. 
 
 Extremely Extremely Fair
Unfair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
The seller sets different prices for different groups of customers based on 
customer characteristics, such as age or credit history.  The different prices do 
not reflect any difference in costs to the seller. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
Depending upon how much people buy, the seller sets different prices.  Those 
who buy more pay lower per unit costs. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
The seller sets its price to match the lowest average price offered by its competitors 
in their market. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
The seller determines its total cost, then adds a "markup" to achieve its 
profit.  That determines the final price. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
The price is negotiated between the seller and one or more buyers.  Each offers 
the price they are willing to accept or pay until a final price is agreed upon. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
The seller sets the price based on customer demand.  When the customer 
demand is high, the price is set higher.  When the customer demand is low, the 
price is set lower. 
  Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
When there is an unexpected shortage predicted, the seller sets the price of 
that product or service higher. 
 
 Extremely Unfair Extremely Fair
How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
Acceptability and Pervasiveness 
Price‐Setting for Products and Services 
 
We'll show you two of those pricing practices again.  This time, we want 
your opinion about using these practices to price six specific products or 
services.   
Price Skimming 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
When a new product or service is first introduced, the 
price is set higher for those people who want it as soon 
as it is available.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
When a new product or service is first introduced, the 
price is set higher for those people who want it as soon 
as it is available. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
When a new product or service is first introduced, the 
price is set higher for those people who want it as soon 
as it is available.  
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
Penetration Pricing 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
When a new product or service is first introduced, the 
price is set lower to get lots of people to buy it.  
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
When a new product or service is first introduced, the 
price is set lower to get lots of people to buy it. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
When a new product or service is first introduced, the 
price is set lower to get lots of people to buy it. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
Price Bundling 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
If a person buys a package or a "bundle" of products or 
services, the seller has one price when they are sold 
together and a different price if they are sold 
separately.  Whether purchased together or separately, 
there is no difference in the products or services. 
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
If a person buys a package or a "bundle" of products or 
services, the seller has one price when they are sold 
together and a different price if they are sold 
separately.  Whether purchased together or separately, 
there is no difference in the products or services. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
       
 
Automobile Insurance
 
Concert Tickets
       
If a person buys a package or a "bundle" of products or 
services, the seller has one price when they are sold 
together and a different price if they are sold 
separately.  Whether purchased together or separately, 
there is no difference in the products or services. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
Bananas
       
Random Discounting 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
Within a set price range, the seller offers the product or 
service at different prices on a random basis.  So 
different people will pay different prices depending on 
when they buy.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
Within a set price range, the seller offers the product or 
service at different prices on a random basis.  So 
different people will pay different prices depending on 
when they buy. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
Within a set price range, the seller offers the product or 
service at different prices on a random basis.  So 
different people will pay different prices depending on 
when they buy.  
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
Captive Pricing 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
The seller sets the initial price lower, knowing that 
consumers will need to buy refills, rechargers, or 
replacement parts over time.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
The seller sets the initial price lower, knowing that 
consumers will need to buy refills, rechargers, or 
replacement parts over time. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
Extremely Extremely 
 Unacceptable Acceptable
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
The seller sets the initial price lower, knowing that 
consumers will need to buy refills, rechargers, or 
replacement parts over time. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
Price Discrimination 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
The seller sets different prices for different groups of 
customers based on customer characteristics, such as 
age or credit history.  The different prices do not reflect 
any difference in costs to the seller. 
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
The seller sets different prices for different groups of 
customers based on customer characteristics, such as 
age or credit history.  The different prices do not reflect 
any difference in costs to the seller. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Bananas
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
The seller sets different prices for different groups of 
customers based on customer characteristics, such as 
age or credit history.  The different prices do not reflect 
any difference in costs to the seller. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
Bananas
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
Volume Discounting 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
Depending upon how much people buy, the seller sets 
different prices.  Those who buy more pay lower per 
unit costs.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
Depending upon how much people buy, the seller sets 
different prices.  Those who buy more pay lower per 
unit costs. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Concert Tickets
       
       
 
Bananas
 
Athletic Shoes
       
Depending upon how much people buy, the seller sets 
different prices.  Those who buy more pay lower per 
unit costs. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Bananas
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
 
Automobile Insurance
       
Price Matching 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
The seller sets its price to match the lowest average 
price offered by its competitors in their market.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
The seller sets its price to match the lowest average 
price offered by its competitors in their market. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
The seller sets its price to match the lowest average 
price offered by its competitors in their market. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
       
Athletic Shoes
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
Cost Plus 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
The seller determines its total cost, then adds a 
"markup" to achieve its profit.  That determines the 
final price.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
The seller determines its total cost, then adds a 
"markup" to achieve its profit.  That determines the 
final price.  
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
       
Concert Tickets
 
Bananas
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
The seller determines its total cost, then adds a 
"markup" to achieve its profit.  That determines the 
final price.  
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
Bananas
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
Price Discovery 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
The price is negotiated between the seller and one or 
more buyers.  Each offers the price they are willing to 
accept or pay until a final price is agreed upon.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
The price is negotiated between the seller and one or 
more buyers.  Each offers the price they are willing to 
accept or pay until a final price is agreed upon.  
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
The price is negotiated between the seller and one or 
more buyers.  Each offers the price they are willing to 
accept or pay until a final price is agreed upon. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
  Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Bananas
       
Demand Pricing 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
The seller sets the price based on customer demand.  
When the customer demand is high, the price is set 
higher.  When the customer demand is low, the price is 
set lower.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
The seller sets the price based on customer demand.  
When the customer demand is high, the price is set 
higher.  When the customer demand is low, the price is 
set lower. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
The seller sets the price based on customer demand.  
When the customer demand is high, the price is set 
higher.  When the customer demand is low, the price is 
set lower. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Bananas
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
Inside Info Supply Pricing 
 
Think again about the following price-setting practice: 
 
When there is an unexpected shortage predicted, the 
seller sets the price of that product or service higher.  
 
(Please click on the arrow to continue.) 
When there is an unexpected shortage predicted, the 
seller sets the price of that product or service higher. 
For each type of purchase, how acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this 
way?  That is, how acceptable is it to use this practice to set prices for American 
consumers? 
 
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
 
Athletic Shoes
       
 
Automobile Insurance
       
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely 
Acceptable
       
 
Bananas
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
When there is an unexpected shortage predicted, the 
seller sets the price of that product or service higher. 
In your opinion, how common is this price-setting practice used to price the 
following: 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
 
High Defintion TV (HDTV)
       
 
Cell Phone with Service
       
 
Concert Tickets
       
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
       
 
Automobile Insurance
 
Bananas
       
 
Athletic Shoes
       
NFC 
The next section asks general questions about thinking. 
Please respond to the following questions by indicating your level of agreement with each statement.
 Strongly Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
1. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities.        
2. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I’ll have to 
think in depth about something.        
3. I only think as hard as I have to.        
4. The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.        
5. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking about how prices are set by 
businesses.        
Pricing Knowledge 
Why Businesses Use Certain Practices 
 
Following are a list of formal names for different methods of setting prices.  With each is 
an example and an explanation of why a business might use that approach. 
 
For each, we want to know whether the explanation is True, False, or you don't know. 
z Click TRUE if this is why a business might price this way.  
z Click FALSE if you think it is not the reason.  
z Click DK if you don't know.   
Captive Pricing - "$3.00 for a non-disposable, easy grip razor, and $10.00 for a package of 8 replacement 
razor blades."  Captive pricing is used by marketers knowing that, eventually, consumers will need to 
purchase the high-priced replacement components if they want to continue using the product.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
No Haggle Pricing - "All automobiles for sale at the lowest price possible - no haggling!"  No haggle pricing is 
used by marketers in order to prove to buyers that negotiations will be fair.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
Partitioned Pricing - "$30.00 for a button-up, 100% cotton, long-sleeve shirt, plus $5.00 for shipping and 
handling."  Partitioned pricing is used by marketers to show consumers that the marketer is offering attractive 
shipping and handling rates.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
Penetration Pricing - "A four-pack of a new brand of AA batteries -- $2.00."  Penetration pricing is used by 
marketers so that, by setting prices low, consumers will be encouraged to try the product.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
Price Bundlng - "Computer having a 1.1 GHz processor and 128 MB memory and laserjet printer for $1100."  
Price bundling is used by marketers in order to increase revenue over what would have been obtained had 
the products been priced separately.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
Price Skimming - "Brand new product - videophone $500."  Price skimming is used by marketers to appeal to 
consumers who are willing to pay a high price for a new product.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
Random Discounting - "A brand of orange juice's (64 oz or 1/2 gallon) price over a four-week time period was 
as follows: Week 1 $2.50, Week 2 $2.50, Week 3 $1.50, Week 4 $2.50."  Random discounting is used to 
obtain sales from both consumers who carefully search for low prices and consumers who do not check 
prices carefully.
 TRUE 
 FALSE 
 DK 
Demographics 
For the final set of questions, please tell us a little about yourself.  This 
information will be used for classification purposes and used only in 
aggregate form.
1. Are you...
 Male 
 Female 
2. Which of the following best describes your ethnic or racial background:
 Asian or Asian American 
 Black or African American 
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Native American 
 White/Caucasian 
 Other 
3. Please select the age category that best describes you:
 Under 21 
 21-24 
 25-34 
 35-44 
 45-54 
 55-64 
 65-74 
 75+ 
4. For your household, how much of the grocery shopping do YOU personally do?
 Little or none 
 Some, but less than half 
 Half or more 
5. How familiar are you with each of the following products or services?
 NOT at All Familiar Very Familiar
Athletic Shoes      
Automobile Insurance
     
Bananas      
Cell Phone and Service      
Concert Tickets      
High Definition TV (HDTV)      
6. Please select the category that best describes your total annual household income:
 Under $25,000 
 $25,000-$34,999 
 $35,000-$49,999 
 $50,000-$74,999 
 $75,000-$99,999 
 $100,000-$149,999 
 $150,000-$199,999 
 $200,000+ 
7. Please indicate your geographic region (select only one):
 Midwest (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI) 
 Mid Atlantic (DE, MD, NJ, PA, VA, WV, DC) 
 Southeast (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN) 
 Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NY, RI, VT) 
 Northwest (AK, ID, MT, OR, WA, WY) 
 Southwest (AZ, CA, CO, HA, NV, NM, OK, TX, UT) 
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Appendix E: Experiment Manipulations 
 
1) High Procedural Fairness (Cost Plus Pricing) 
• The seller sets the price to its customers based on its total costs plus a “mark-up” to 
achieve its profit.   
• The reason for increases or decreases in price is because the costs to the seller have 
increased or decreased.   
• People pay different prices depending on whether costs have gone up or down for the 
seller. 
 
EXAMPLE:  
• Seller’s costs = $85 
• Mark-up = $15 
• Price to customers = $100 
 
a) High Pervasiveness 
This cost-plus pricing happens all the time with electronics.  
Many, if not all, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In 
other words, it is very common for electronics retailers to set the price for products based 
on their total costs plus a "mark-up" to achieve its profit.   
 
 b) Low Pervasiveness 
This cost-plus pricing almost never happens with electronics.  
Few, if any, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In other 
words, it is not very common for electronics retailers to set the price for products based 
on their total costs plus a "mark-up" to achieve its profit.   
 
 
2) Low Procedural Fairness (Random Discounting) 
• The seller considers its costs, then sets different prices on a random basis.   
• Any increases or decreases in price occur completely at random.  
• People pay different prices depending on when they buy. 
 
EXAMPLE: Over three separate Sundays, the seller’s advertised price might be: 
• Week 1 $100 
• Week 2 $90 
• Week 3 $115 
 
 a) High Pervasiveness 
This random pricing happens all the time with electronics.  
Many, if not all, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In 
other words, it is very common for electronics retailers to set different prices on a random 
basis.   
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b) Low Pervasiveness 
This random pricing almost never happens with electronics.  
Few, if any, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In other 
words, it is not very common for electronics retailers to set different prices on a random 
basis.   
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Appendix F: Study 2 Item Selection Survey 
 
 Default Question Block 
Welcome! 
 
This survey is designed to help fine tune my measurement instruments for a dissertation 
study on price fairness.  Thank you for your help. 
 
I have two different measurement instruments that will be presented to you in this 
survey.  The first deals with my hypothesized two dimensions of price fairness, while the 
second involves consumer response behavior to a fair/unfair price. 
My research proposes that when a consumer is presented with a price, s/he has two 
assessments of the fairness of that price: (1) a cognitive assessment and (2) an affective 
assessment.  The affective assessment is a personal, emotional, first reaction to the 
price, whereas the cognitive assessment is a deductive judgment of whether the price is 
equitable, fair and just to all.  The following table presents the differences between the 
two assessments. 
 
Two Dimensions of Price Fairness 
 
Cognitive  
Assessment
Affective  
Assessment
Slow Rapid
Rules-based Feelings-based
Controlled Automatic
Deductive Emotional
Deliberative Reflexive
  
COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT OF PRICE FAIRNESS 
 
The following are items from the pricing literature that suggest cognitive assessment of price fairness.   
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree that the item is a measure of cognitive assessment of price 
fairness.
 Agree Disagree
This is the price that I would expect to pay.   
This is a reasonable price.   
This price is questionable.   
All things considered, this price is justified.   
The value of the product may not be worth the price.   
Can you think of other items that may measure cognitive assessment of price fairness?  If so, please type 
them in this space. 
 
  
  
AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF PRICE FAIRNESS 
 
The following are items from the pricing literature that suggest affective assessment of price fairness.   
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree that the item is a measure of affective assessment of price 
fairness.
 Agree Disagree
I'd be happy with this price.   
This price is honest.   
I'd be completely satisfied with this price.   
This price is a rip-off.   
This price is an outrage.   
Can you think of other items that may measure affective assessment of price fairness?  If so, please type 
them in this space. 
 
Consumer response behaviors are the actions or inactions taken by the consumer in response to the 
price.  There are four categorizations of response behavior to a fair/unfair price: (1) Promotion, (2) No 
Action, (3) Self-Protection, and (4) Revenge-Seeking.  
 
Promotion occurs when the consumer goes out of his/her way to support the seller or to give positive 
endorsements about the seller. 
 
No action describes the situation when the consumer does not plan to take action to bring equality 
back to the transaction, or does not intend to change plans for future transactions with the seller, even 
if the price is perceived as unfair. 
  
Self-protection behaviors include responses (e.g., shopping or purchase intentions) that the consumer 
partakes in to restore equality to the transaction, or to protect him/herself or loved ones in future 
transactions with the seller.   
 
Revenge-seeking behaviors (e.g., tarnishing the seller's reputation) are intended to purposefully 
damage the seller in efforts to “get even” or "get back at" the seller. 
The following list was generated to capture each of the four categorizations of consumer response behavior 
(i.e., promotion, no action, self-protection, and revenge-seeking).  Please check the box of the categorization 
that you feel the item best reflects.   If you feel there is more than one category the item fits into, you may 
check more than one box. 
 
The first set of items are behavioral responses that may occur while at the retailer, and the second set of 
items are behavioral responses that may occur in the future. 
 
 
 
BEHAVIOR "WHILE AT THE RETAILER" ITEMS 
 Promotion No Action Self-Protection Revenge-Seeking
Buy the product from this retailer?     
Express your approval to the store manager?     
Express your approval to other customers in the store?     
Express your disapproval to the store manager?     
Express your disapproval to other customers in the store?     
FUTURE BEHAVIOR ITEMS 
 Promotion No Action Self-Protection Revenge-Seeking
Shop more with this retailer?     
Shop less with this retailer?     
Shop about the same?     
Give positive recommendations to friends and family?     
Make negative comments to friends and family?     
Post positive online reviews about the retailer?     
Post negative online reviews about the retailer?     
Send a complaint to company headquarters?     
Call or write to the Better Business Bureau or other consumer organization so that 
as many people as possible would hear about my negative experience?     
Seek legal action against the seller, store, or company?     
You have completed the survey.  Thank you for your help. 
 
Please click on the arrow to submit your answers. 
  121
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix G: Study 2 Survey 
 
 
 Default Question Block 
 
 
 
Welcome! 
 
Your opinions are important to us! You are one of a small group of consumers asked to participate in 
this study. 
 
We want to know what people like you think about how prices are set by the seller.  It will help 
businesses be more attentive to customer opinions. 
 
Participation is easy!  You'll read about different ways that the selling price for various products and 
services might be set by the seller.  Then we want your honest opinion about each. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you need more information, please contact Jodie Ferguson at jferguson@gsu.edu or (404)413-7650, 
or Susan Vogtner at (404)413-3513. 
To begin, click on the arrow below.   
  
z There are no right or wrong answers.  
z Your answers are anonymous, meaning that your name will not be connected 
in any way to your answers.  
z The survey should take less than 15 minutes to complete.  
z In this survey, you will be asked to read a business situation.  Different people 
taking the survey may see different situations.  At the conclusion of the survey, 
we will provide more information about the situations.   
z There is no known risk to participating in this online survey beyond what you
experience in your normal day of life.  
z Your participation in this research study is completely voluntary and you may 
stop at any time without losing any benefits.  
4. Please select the age category that best describes you:
 Under 21 
 21-24 
 25-34 
 35-44 
45-54 
  55-64 
 65-74 
 75+ 
1. For your household, how much of the grocery shopping do YOU personally do?
 Little or none 
 Some, but less than half 
 Half or more 
Part I 
 
 
When a business makes a product available for customers to purchase, the 
business must determine what price to ask the customer to pay. 
 
Businesses can use different price-setting practices to determine the asking 
price.   
Cell 3 
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
z The seller considers its costs, then sets different prices on a random basis.   
z Any increases or decreases in price occur completely at random.   
z People pay different prices depending on when they buy. 
   
z EXAMPLE: Over three separate Sundays, the seller’s advertised price might be: 
·        Week 1 $100 
·        Week 2 $90 
·        Week 3 $115 
 Extremely Unfair
Extremely 
Fair
1. How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
This random pricing happens all the time with electronics.  
 
Many, if not all, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In other words, it is very 
common for electronics retailers to set different prices on a random basis. 
  
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
2. How common is this price-setting practice used to price electronics?        
  
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely
Acceptable
3. How acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this way? That is, how acceptable is it to use 
this practice to set prices for American consumers?        
Imagine a situation where you are shopping for a high definition television (HDTV).  
 Not at all Familiar Very Familiar
4. How familiar are you personally with HDTVs?      
You have the money for an HDTV and are ready to buy.  You go to a local retailer.   
Imagine the following: 
 
 
HDTV Price: $1,249.99 
 
(Other similar size HDTVs you've looked at are priced between $1,000-$1,500.) 
  
z They have an HDTV with exactly the features you were looking for.   
z It is one of the brands you wanted to buy.   
z It is available today from a retailer with a good customer service record.   
  
  
The retailer that is offering this HDTV set the price ($1249.99) using the following practice:  The 
seller sets different prices on a random basis.  
  
5. Think about how much you agree or disagree with each statement below: 
 Strongly Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
This price just feels right.        
This is the price that I would expect to pay.        
I'd be happy with the price.        
People who know the market would find this to be a reasonable price.        
I'd be completely satisfied with this price.        
This price is questionable.        
I am pleasantly surprised with the price.        
The value of the product may not be worth the price.        
All things considered, this price is justified.        
This price is dishonest.        
This price is a rip-off.        
 
 Very Unfair Very Fair
6. How would you rate the fairness of the price?        
Cell 4 
 Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
z The seller considers its costs, then sets different prices on a random basis.     
z Any increases or decreases in price occur completely at random.     
z People pay different prices depending on when they buy. 
 
EXAMPLE: Over three separate Sundays, the seller’s advertised price might be: 
·        Week 1 $100 
·        Week 2 $90 
·        Week 3 $115 
  
 Extremely Unfair
Extremely 
Fair
1. How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
This random pricing almost never happens with electronics.  
 
Few, if any, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In other words, it is not very 
common for electronics retailers to set different prices to its customers on a random basis. 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
2. How common is this price-setting practice used to price electronics?        
  
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely
Acceptable
3. How acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this way? That is, how acceptable is it to use 
this practice to set prices for American consumers?        
Imagine a situation where you are shopping for a high definition television (HDTV).  
 Not at all Familiar Very Familiar
4. How familiar are you personally with HDTVs?      
You have the money for an HDTV and are ready to buy.  You go to a local retailer.   
Imagine the following: 
 
 
HDTV Price: $1,249.99 
 
(Other similar size HDTVs you've looked at are priced between $1,000-$1,500.) 
  
z They have an HDTV with exactly the features you were looking for.   
z It is one of the brands you wanted to buy.   
z It is available today from a retailer with a good customer service record.   
  
  
The retailer that is offering this HDTV set the price ($1249.99) using the following practice:  The 
seller sets different prices on a random basis.   
  
5. Think about how much you agree or disagree with each statement below: 
 Strongly Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
This price is dishonest.        
I'd be happy with the price.        
I'd be completely satisfied with this price.        
This is the price that I would expect to pay.        
I am pleasantly surprised with the price.        
This price is questionable.        
The value of the product may not be worth the price.        
This price is a rip-off.        
This price just feels right.        
All things considered, this price is justified.        
People who know the market would find this to be a reasonable price.        
 
 Very Unfair Very Fair
6. How would you rate the fairness of the price?        
Cell 1 
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
 
z The seller sets the price to its customers based on its total costs plus a “mark-up” to achieve its profit.   
z The reason for increases or decreases in price is because the costs to the seller have increased or 
decreased.    
z People pay difference prices depending on whether costs have gone up or down for the seller.  
   
      EXAMPLE:  
z Seller's costs = $85  
z Mark-up = $15  
z Price to customers = $100  
  
 Extremely Unfair
Extremely 
Fair
1. How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
This cost-plus pricing happens all the time with electronics.  
 
Many, if not all, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In other words, it is very 
common for electronics retailers to set the price for products based on their total costs plus a "mark-up" to 
achieve its profit. 
   
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
2. How common is this price-setting practice used to price electronics?        
  
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely
Acceptable
3. How acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this way? That is, how acceptable is it to use 
this practice to set prices for American consumers?        
Imagine a situation where you are shopping for a high definition television (HDTV).  
 Not at all Familiar Very Familiar
4. How familiar are you personally with HDTVs?      
You have the money for an HDTV and are ready to buy.  You go to a local retailer.   
Imagine the following: 
 
 
HDTV Price: $1,249.99 
 
(Other similar size HDTVs you've looked at are priced between $1,000-$1,500.) 
 
z They have an HDTV with exactly the features you were looking for.   
z It is one of the brands you wanted to buy.   
z It is available today from a retailer with a good customer service record.   
The retailer that is offering this HDTV set the price ($1249.99) using the following practice:  The 
seller set the price based on its total costs plus a "mark-up" to achieve its profit.   
5. Think about how much you agree or disagree with each statement below: 
 Strongly Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
The value of the product may not be worth the price.        
I'd be happy with the price.        
I'd be completely satisfied with this price.        
This is the price that I would expect to pay.        
This price is a rip-off.        
I am pleasantly surprised with the price.        
People who know the market would find this to be a reasonable price.        
This price is questionable.        
This price just feels right.        
This price is dishonest.        
All things considered, this price is justified.        
 
 Very Unfair Very Fair
6. How would you rate the fairness of the price?        
Cell 2 
Suppose a business uses the following approach to set prices for their customers: 
 
z The seller sets the price to its customers based on its total costs plus a “mark-up” to achieve its profit.   
z The reason for increases or decreases in price is because the costs to the seller have increased or 
decreased.  
z People pay difference prices depending on whether costs have gone up or down for the seller.  
  
EXAMPLE: 
- Seller’s costs = $85 
- Mark-up = $15 
- Price to customers = $100 
 Extremely Unfair
Extremely 
Fair
1. How fair is this practice of setting prices?        
This cost-plus pricing almost never happens with electronics.  
 
Few, if any, electronics sellers use this price-setting practice to price products.  In other words, it is not very 
common for electronics retailers to set the price for products based on their total costs plus a "mark-up" to 
achieve its profit. 
 
 
 Extremely Uncommon
Extremely 
Common
2. How common is this price-setting practice used to price electronics?        
  
 Extremely Unacceptable
Extremely
Acceptable
3. How acceptable is it for businesses to set prices this way? That is, how acceptable is it to use 
this practice to set prices for American consumers?        
Imagine a situation where you are shopping for a high definition television (HDTV).  
 Not at all Familiar Very Familiar
4. How familiar are you personally with HDTVs?      
You have the money for an HDTV and are ready to buy.  You go to a local retailer.   
Imagine the following: 
 
z They have an HDTV with exactly the features you were looking for.   
z It is one of the brands you wanted to buy.   
z It is available today from a retailer with a good customer service record.   
 
HDTV Price: $1,249.99 
 
(Other similar size HDTVs you've looked at are priced between $1,000-$1,500.) 
 
  
The retailer that is offering this HDTV set the price ($1249.99) using the following practice:  The 
seller set the price based on its total costs plus a "mark-up" to achieve its profit.   
5. Think about how much you agree or disagree with each statement below: 
 Strongly Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
People who know the market would find this to be a reasonable price.        
The value of the product may not be worth the price.        
This price is dishonest.        
This price is a rip-off.        
I'd be completely satisfied with this price.        
This price just feels right.        
This is the price that I would expect to pay.        
This price is questionable.        
I'd be happy with the price.        
All things considered, this price is justified.        
I am pleasantly surprised with the price.        
 
 Very Unfair Very Fair
6. How would you rate the fairness of the price?        
Response Behaviors 
 
 Definitely Would Have No Effect
Probably Would Have No 
Effect
Probably Would Have 
Some Effect
Definitely Would Have 
Some Effect
7. Based upon what you know about how this retailer prices 
electronics, how would this affect your future shopping with this 
retailer?
    
Please think about what you might actually do in this situation.   
 
Would you... 
 Definitely Would NotProbably Would Not Probably Would Definitely Would
8. Buy the HDTV from this retailer?     
  Definitely Would NotProbably Would Not Probably Would Definitely Would
9. Express your approval to the store manager?     
10. Express your approval to other customers in the store?     
 
 Definitely Would NotProbably Would Not Probably Would Definitely Would
11. Express your disapproval to the store manager?     
12. Express your disapproval to other customers in the store?     
In the future, based on this offer and what you know about the retailer, would you... 
 Shop a Lot Less Shop a Little Less Shop about the Same Shop a Little More Shop a Lot More 
13.      
Would you...
 Definitely Would NotProbably Would Not Probably Would Definitely Would
14. Give positive recommendations to friends or family?     
15. Make negative comments to friends or family?     
 
 Definitely Would NotProbably Would Not Probably Would Definitely Would
16. Post positive online reviews about the retailer?     
17. Post negative online reviews?     
 
 Definitely Would NotProbably Would Not Probably Would Definitely Would
18. Send a complaint to company headquarters?     
19. Call or write to the Better Business Bureau or other consumer organization so that as many 
people as possible would hear about my negative experience?     
20. Seek legal action against the seller, store, or company?     
Pricing Knowledge 
Part II 
 
Businesses may use different methods for setting their prices to customers.  The following questions 
are about WHY you think a business may or may not use a specific price-setting practice.   
 
For each of the following there is an example along with a possible explanation for why the company 
would use that method of setting price.  We want your opinion as to whether these explanations are 
TRUE reasons for using a price-setting practice or FALSE reasons.  If you don't know, select Don't 
Know. 
 
1. "$3.00 for a non-disposable, easy grip razor, and $10.00 for a package of 8 replacement razor blades."  
Called captive pricing, this method is used by marketers knowing that, eventually, consumers will need to 
purchase the high-priced replacement components if they want to continue using the product.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
2. "All automobiles for sale at the lowest price possible - no haggling!"  Called no haggle pricing, this method 
is used by marketers in order to prove to buyers that negotiations will be fair.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
3. "$30.00 for a button-up, 100% cotton, long-sleeve shirt, plus $5.00 for shipping and handling."  Called 
partitioned pricing, this method is used by marketers to show consumers that the marketer is offering 
attractive shipping and handling rates.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
4. "A four-pack of a new brand of AA batteries -- $2.00."  Called penetration pricing, this method is used by 
marketers so that, by setting prices low, consumers will be encouraged to try the product.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
5. "Computer having a 1.1 GHz processor and 128 MB memory, AND a laserjet printer for $1100."  Called 
price bundling, this method is used by marketers in order to increase revenue over what would have been 
obtained had the products been priced separately.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
6. "Brand new product - videophone $500."  Called price skimming, this method is used by marketers to 
appeal to consumers who are willing to pay a high price for a new product.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
7. "A brand of orange juice's (64 oz or 1/2 gallon) price over a four-week time period was as follows: Week 1 
$2.50, Week 2 $2.50, Week 3 $1.50, Week 4 $2.50."  Called random discounting, this method is used to 
obtain sales from both consumers who carefully search for low prices and consumers who do not check 
prices carefully.
 TRUE - this is why a business would price this way 
 FALSE - this is not why 
 Don't Know 
Assertiveness and Aggressiveness 
Part III 
 
This section asks about your general shopping behavior.  Please respond to the following statements by 
indicating your level of agreement with each statement. 
 Strongly Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
1. If an inexpensive product turns out to be defective, I usually keep it or throw it away 
rather than put up a fuss or complain.        
2. Compared to most people I know, I am probably more likely to return an unsatisfactory 
product.        
3. I would attempt to notify store management if I thought service in a store was 
particularly bad.        
4. If I am having difficulty getting a problem taken care of, on occasion, I have caused a 
stir that attracts the attention of other customers.        
5. I get a certain amount of satisfaction from putting a discourteous salesperson in his or 
her place.        
6. Salespeople need to be told off when they are rude.        
Demographics 
  
  
Final Section 
 
For the final set of questions, please tell us a little about yourself.  This information will be used for 
classification purposes and used only in aggregate form.
2. Are you...
 Male? 
 Female? 
3. Which of the following best describes your ethnic or racial background (select all that apply)?
 Asian or Asian American 
 Black or African American 
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Native American 
 White/Caucasian 
 Other 
5. Please select the category that best describes your total annual household income:
 Under $25,000 
 $25,000-$34,999 
 $35,000-$49,999 
 $50,000-$74,999 
 $75,000-$99,999 
 $100,000-$149,999 
 $150,000-$199,999 
 $200,000+ 
6. Please indicate your geographic region (select only one):
 Midwest (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI) 
 Mid Atlantic (DE, MD, NJ, PA, VA, WV, DC) 
 Southeast (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN) 
 Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NY, RI, VT) 
 Northwest (AK, ID, MT, OR, WA, WY) 
 Southwest (AZ, CA, CO, HA, NV, NM, OK, TX, UT) 
 Puerto Rico 
 Outside the United States 
In this study, you were asked to imagine buying an HDTV based on how the retailer priced it. 
 Different people were shown different price-setting practices and asked their opinion of the practice 
and how that would affect their behavior. 
 
As you may be aware, sellers of electronics may use many different methods to set prices.  For 
example, electronic products might reflect the cost to the retailer plus some markup for their profit. 
 They may also offer price to match or beat other retailers, regardless of their actual cost.  Some 
may offer different prices on a seemingly random basis.  Electronics may be auctioned through sites 
such as Ebay.  These are only some of the possibilities.  We wanted to know how people like you felt 
about different pricing practices.   
  
Because pricing practices vary, some methods may be more or less commonly used in different 
industries.  In this study, pricing practices were described as more or less common although no 
evidence was used in this study to support that one method is more commonly used than another. 
 We wanted to understand how that commonness affected your opinions about the pricing practices. 
 
At this time you have completed this survey.  Please click on the arrow below to submit your answers. 
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